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THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CONGRESS:
LEGISLATOR INSIDER TRADING AND THE
FIDUCIARY NORM AGAINST
CORRUPTION
Sung Hui Kimt

On April 4, 201Z Congress passed the STOCK Act, which officially
banned the practice of insider tradingby members of Congress and formally
declared them to be fiduciariesfor purposes of federal insider trading law.
The impetus for the legislation was the perception, held by a majority of commentators, that insidertrading by members of Congress did not violate federal securities law because they were not fiduciaries to anyone. In this
Article, I make the case that the majority view was and continues to be
wron& and why that matters. Specifically, I arguethat even if the STOCK
Act had not passed and even if it were to be repealed,judges could build on
existing precedents andemploy unextraordinaryjudicial reasoningto impose
the requisitefiduciary duties on legislators. In Part 1, I provide a succinct
summary of federal insider tradinglaw, focusing on the controversialelement as applied to legislators-theexistence and breach offiduciay duty. I
then explore the standard approach taken by courts in resolving novel instances of potentialyfiduciary relationships: traditionalanalogical reasoning to well-established cases. In Part II, I employ this standardapproach to
make the case thatjudges couldfind legislatorsto befiduciariesunderfederal
insidertradinglaw. In PartIII, I more deeply justify the analogicalreasoning employed in PartI. Specryically, I show that one core purpose offiduciary law has been to fight public corruption and that legislator insider
tradingcould be classsfied as a form of public corruption. This analysis
helps revealan organicalignmentbetween recognizing legislatorinsidertrading as a breach offiduciary duty and an important goal of the common law
of fiduciaries-that of deterring cornuption. Part IV addresses various
objections.
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INTRODUCrION

On September 18, 2008, at 7 p.m., Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke met with
members of Congress in a closed-door briefing that was so secretive
even cell phones were banned.' Among those attending was Representative Spencer Bachus, the ranking Republican on the House Financial Services Committee.2 As Paulson recounts:
Ben [Bernanke] emphasized how the financial crisis could spill into
the real economy. As stocks dropped perhaps a further twenty percent, General Motors would go bankrupt, and unemployment
1 60 Minutes: Congress: Trading Stodk on Inside Information? (CBS television broadcast
Nov. 13, 2011), availableat http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388130n.
2 Bachus became Committee Chairman following the Republican congressional victories of 2010. PETER ScHwEIzER, THRoW THEM ALL Our 24 (2011).
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would rise .. . if we did nothing.

. .
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. It [was] a matter of days,

[Bernanke] said, before there [would be] a meltdown in the global
financial system.3
According to Paulson, these dire predictions left members of
Congress "ashen-faced."4 The very next day, Representative Bachus
invested in option funds designed to rise in value when markets fall. 5
Just four days later, he sold, making more than $5,000 in profit, nearly
doubling his investment. 6 As a 60 Minutes television report put it:
"While Congressman Bachus was publicly trying to keep the economy
from cratering, he was privately betting that it would . . . ."
Did Representative Bachus engage in what I refer to as "legislator
insider trading"-the trading by members of federal or state legislatures on the basis of material nonpublic information acquired
through their positions? Did he trade on information learned in the
closed-door briefing? Or was the timing of his trade mere coincidence? Although he was cleared of ethical wrongdoing by the Office
of Congressional Ethics, 8 we may never know the truth behind
Bachus's suspicious trades.
Publicity surrounding Bachus's trades, however, did focus public
attention to what was widely perceived as a gaping loophole in the
federal securities laws. That loophole, according to a majority of commentators opining on the issue,9 was that federal insider trading laws
generally did not reach members of Congress.10 For example, as for3

HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRmK 259 (2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

4 Id
5 SCuWEIZER,
6

supra note 2, at 28.

j4

7 Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information?,supra note 1.
8 Mary Orndorff, US. Rep. Spencer Bachus Clearedin Ethics Investigation,AL.cou (Apr.
30, 2012, 6:42 PM), http://blog.al.com/sweerhome/2012/04/usjrep-spenceribachus
cleared.html. Although Bachus defended his trade by noting that information about the
dire state of the economy was generally known to the public, in my view, that is surely not
the relevant market-moving information in question. The relevant market-moving information was the fact that both the Treasury Secretary and Chair of the Federal Reserve
Board convened a secret emergency meeting proposing unprecedented governmental intervention to avert economic disaster.
9 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. Cone. L. 281,
295-96 (2011) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway] (describing the "predominant
view"); Andrew George, Note, Public(Self)Semice. Illegal Trading on ConfidentialCongressional
Information, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 161, 163 (2008) (describing the "conventional wisdom"); infra note 10.
10

For examples of the majority view, see RicHARD W. PAINTER, GErlNG TH{EGOVERN

MENT AMERIcA DEsERvEs: How Encs REFoRm CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 163 (2009) ("Insider trading law ... may not be sufficiently rigorous to prevent abuses by government
officials."); Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supranote 9, at 285 ("[T]he quirks of the relevant
laws almost certainly would prevent members of Congress from being successfully prosecuted."); Iuider Tradingand CongressionalAccountability: HeringBefore the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affais, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement ofJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Professor
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mer Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Arthur Levitt maintained, members of Congress "benefit from an
exemption that the average investor doesn't benefit from. They're
immune from insider trading laws.""1
To be clear, Levitt was not referring to an explicit statutory exemption like the one that was drafted in Title VII.12 Rather, this socalled immunity flowed from the difficulty of establishing the breach
of a fiduciary (or fiduciary-like) 3 duty, a required element of an inof Law, Columbia Univ.) [hereinafter Coffee Testimony] (agreeing with Professor Bainbridge); Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9J.
Bus. & SEC. L. 199, 200 (2009) (noting that legislator insider trading that looks the same as
corporate insider trading is nonetheless legal); Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on
Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of PoliticalIntelligencefor Pfit, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1451, 1483 (2010) (concluding that "current law does not support holding government
insiders . .. liable for insider trading without substantially manipulating current doctrine");
AlanJ. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returnsfrom the Common Stoce Investments of the U.S. Senate,
39J. FiN. & QuANrrATvE ANALYsIs 661, 676 (2004) ("Current law does not prohibit Senators from trading stock on the basis of information acquired in the course of performing
their normal Senatorial functions.").
For examples of the minority view, see Insider Trading and CongressionalAccountability:
IearingBefore the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Donald C. Langevoort, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (arguing
that federal insider trading law does not exempt legislators or anyone else); Jonathan R.
Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Essay, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant Companions or OccasionalBedfellows?, 26 YAuz J. oN REa. 89, 107 (2009) (arguing that a prohibition on legislator insider trading is legally plausible and intuitively appealing); Donna M. Nagy, Insider
Trading, CongressionalOfficials, and Duties ofEntrustment,91 B.U. L. REv. 1105, 1138 (2011)
(arguing that the majority view is rooted in "twin misconceptions") [hereinafter Nagy, CongressionalOfficials]; George, supra note 9, at 163 (arguing that congressional insider trading
is illegal under misappropriation theory).
To be sure, there is earlier scholarship that concludes that government officials are
covered by federal insider trading laws. However, those articles did not focus on the distinction between elected and appointed officials, which distinction is critical to the majority view. See, e.g., Herbert T. Krimmel, The Government Insider and Rule l0b-5: A New
AplicationforanExpandingDoctrine,47 S. CAi. L. REv. 1491, 1492, 1503-04 (1974); Donald
C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CAuF. L REv. 1, 34-35 (1982) [hereinafter Langevoort, A Post-Chiarella Restatement].
II Bloomberg Surveillance:Arthur Levitt, Board Member, Bloomberg LP (Bloomberg Radio
broadcast Oct. 13, 2010) (transcript available through Analyst Wire, 2010 WLNR
20471195).
12 Originally, Tide VII exempted Congress from anti-discrimination and other
workforce protection laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (excluding the "United States"
from the definition of "employer"). Subsequent statutes have closed this loophole. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 ("Employment by Federal Government").
In addition, Section 3(c) of the Exchange Act, which grants immunity from the federal securities laws to certain government entities, only applies to an employee or official
when such employee or official is "acting in the course of his official duty." See Krimmel,
supra note 10, at 1492. As such, legislator insider trading, which is clearly not an exercise
of office, is not covered by the immunity. Id.
13 As explained in Part I.A.2.a. below, the breach of a fiduciary or other duty arising
out of a similar relation of trust and confidence, the latter of which I refer to as a "fiduciary-like duty," will satisfy this element. Throughout this Article, when referring to "fiduciary duty," I also include analogous duties imposed due to a relation of trust and
confidence.
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sider trading violation. According to this majority view, unlike employees of the three branches of federal government, who are agents
and thus unquestionably subject to federal insider trading laws, 14
members of Congress are fiduciaries to no one.'5 Members are
"neither employees nor agents of any larger entity."16
Because of this majority understanding, President Obama called
for a new law banning insider trading by members of Congress in his
2012 State of the Union address.' 7 And Congress, after dragging its
feet for years,' 8 responded to public pressure and finally enacted the
14 There is almost no disagreement that employees of the three branches of federal
government are fiduciaries and thus subject to federal insider trading laws. See e.g.,
PAINTER, supra note 10, at 166 (discussing the application of insider trading laws to Executive Branch employees); Bainbridge, Inside the Betway, supranote 9, at 297 ("Under current
law, no serious doctrinal obstacle precludes applying misappropriation theory to employees of Congress, the Executive Branch, and other governmental agencies.").
15 See Coffee Testimony, supra note 10, at 4 ("Members of Congress do not dearly owe
a fiduciary duty (or any similar duty requiring them to be loyal and hold information in
confidence) either to their trading partners in a securities (or commodities) transaction or
to the source of the material, nonpublic information."); PAINTER, supra note 10, at 175
("Today, federal securities law prohibits securities trading on information misappropriated
from most other workplaces, including government workplaces, yet Congress has apparently managed to create sufficient ambiguity around fiduciary obligations of members and
their employees that the rules may not apply to them."); Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway,
supranote 9, at 295 (ultimately rejecting the suggestion that "the electorate" is the beneficiary of a fiduciary obligation by members of Congress because "[w]hat is needed under
insider trading law is either a duty to the person with whom one trades or to the source of
the information, not some generalized duty to members of the public in the abstract");
Barbabella et al., supranote 10, at 215, 217 ("In the case of Congressional insider trading,
... it is not clear that congressmen or their aides owe any party such a duty in more than a
vague sense.... One imagines that this lack of a concrete duty, rather than the vague
sense that congressional representatives ought to place public interests first, might control
if a congressional representative were sued for trading on material nonpublic legislative
information under the current legal regime."); Jerke, supra note 10, at 1483-88 (arguing
that government insiders lack the requisite fiduciary duty under classical theory and noting
the lack of consensus about whether members of Congress are employees of the federal
government for purposes of misappropriation theory).
The same "non-fiduciary" argument could be made about any elected official--e.g.,
president, vice president, governors, elected city officials, elected judges--as well as certain
appointed officials-e.g., state and federal judges. This Article, however, focuses on federal and state legislators, although it cites to precedent establishing the fiduciary status of
other elected officials. See infra Part ILD.2. As a general matter, presidents and vice presidents tend to voluntarily comply with the financial conflicts of interest statutes, which require divestment of holdings in certain situations. See PAmirEa, supra note 10, at 61-62.
For an argument that judges are fiduciaries, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael
Serota, A FiduciaryTheory ofJudging 101 CauU. L REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at
15) [hereinafter Leib et. al, Fiduciary Themy of Judging], available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2029001.
16 Coffee Testimony, supra note 10, at 5.
17 See PresidentBaradk Obama's State of the Union Address, N.Y. TRIES, Jan. 24, 2012, at 9,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/us/politics/state-of-the-union-2012-transcriptbtml
?refhstateoftheunionmessageus ("Send me a bill that bans insider trading by members of
Congress; I will sign it tomorrow.").
18 Representatives Brian Baird (Democrat, Washington) and Louise Slaughter (Democrat, New York) previously introduced versions of the Stop Trading On Congressional
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Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK
Act),' 9 which affirmed Congress's nonexemption from federal insider
trading laws20 and declared that members owe the requisite fiduciary
duties to Congress, the federal government, and US citizens. 21 In
other words, members and employees of Congress are fiduciaries for
purposes of insider trading law, and trading on material nonpublic
information acquired in the course of official duties is deemed a
breach of fiduciary duty.
Given this legislative intervention, one might think that nothing
interesting remains to be said about legislator insider trading or the
fiduciary status of legislators. But we should not overread the Act's
significance and scope. First, the STOCK Act did not address the fiduciary status of elected officials at the state or local level. There are
7,382 members of state legislatures22 who are not covered by the
STOCK Act and may be trading on inside information right now. If
the majority view remains intact for state legislators,23 then they are
not violating federal securities law because they are not breaching any
fiduciary duty. Indeed, a Minnesota state legislator recently blogged:
"It is, in fact, completely legal for a state lawmaker to use confidential
information gained at the [state] Capitol for personal gain."24
Although members of Congress may have more access to juicier
nonpublic information than "mere" state legislators, we should not
Knowledge Act in the 109th, seeH.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); 110th, seeH.R.
2341, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); and 111th Congresses, seeH.R. 682, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009).
19 STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C. app.). The STOCK Act passed in the Senate on a 96-to-3 vote on Feb.
2, 2012. Scott Wong, STOCK Act Passes Senate by Vote of 96-3, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2012, 3:31
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72391.html. The House passed their
version of the STOCK Act by a 417-to-2 vote on Feb. 9, 2012. Seung Min Kim, STOCK Act
Passed by House by Vote of 417-2, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://
On April 4, 2012, President Obama
www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72670.htin.
signed the STOCKAct into law. Matt Compton, President Obama Signs the STOCKAct, THE
Wim HousE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/
04/president-obanmasigns-stock-act.
20 STOCK Act § 4(a).
21 See id. § 4(g)(1); see also id. § 4(b)(1) (stating the purpose of the amendment); id.
4(b) (2) (codifying a duty of "trust and confidence" for members and employees of Congress by amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1). Corresponding provisions cover executive and judicial branch officers and employees. For simplicity, I use the term "fiduciary duty" to
include similar duties arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence.
22 See Number of State lgislatorsandLength of Terms (in Years), NATiONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGIsLArTREs, http://www.ncst.org/legislatures-elections/legislators-legislative-stffdata/number-of-legislators-and-length-of-terms.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
23 Not only did the STOCK Act fail to address state legislators, but the Act itself makes
clear that it shall not "impair or limit the construction of" the existing securities antifraud
provisions. STOCK Act §§ 4(g)(3), 10.
24 Joe Atkins, Insider Trading It's Time to Close a Surprising Loophole, INVERGRovEHErorrsPAcH (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://invergroveheights.patch.com/
blog-posts/insider-trading-its-time-to-close-a-surprising-loophole.
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discount the opportunities that legislators of states with influential
economies and important corporate domiciliaries might exploit. For
example, consider a California state legislator who hears that a new
state bill forcing internet retailers (such as Amazon.com and Overstock.com) to collect sales taxes will soon be introduced.25 Or consider a Minnesota state legislator who learns about a bill that would
authorize the operation of gaming machines by Canterbury Park
Holding Corporation, a publicly traded gaming corporation based in
Minnesota.26 Might a legislator trade on such nonpublic information?
Given the great number of state legislators, it would be foolish to dismiss the risk of their trading.
Second, the relevant provisions of the STOCK Act only addressed
federal insider trading laws. As a result, the majority view, if left uncorrected, could influence the judicial interpretations of other federal
or state laws that are similarly premised on the breach of fiduciary
obligation. For example, the majority of circuits currently require
that the defendant must have breached a fiduciary obligation 27 to the
defrauded person or entity in order to be found guilty under the honest services mail fraud statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346.28 If the
logic of the majority view is correct, then elected officials in those circuits cannot be prosecuted for honest services mail fraud. By contrast,
if the logic of the majority view is wrong, then elected officials would
be subject to prosecution, which result would be more consistent with
precedents that do not sharply distinguish between elected and appointed officials.29
25 Cf Marc Lifsher, Internet Sals Tax Bill Advances in CaiforniaLegislature Los ANGELES
Tmsss (May 31, 2011, 4:41 PM), http://latinesblogs.latimes.com/money-co/2011/05/
internet-sales-tax-bill-advances-in-california-legislature.html (reporting the advancement of
just such a bill).
26 Cf Atkins, supranote 24 (noting that Canterbury Park Holding Company "has seen
its stock suddenly soar and swoon based on action at the State Capitol").
27 See Samantha Hunter, Honest Services Fraudand thetFiduciary RelationshipRequirement:
How the Ninth Circuit Got It Wrong in United States v. Milovanovic, 2012 BYU L. REV. 509,
514-15 (2012) ("The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that
honest services fraud requires the defendant to have breached a fiduciary duty to the victim, while the Second and Eighth Circuits have rejected such a requirement. The Ninth
Circuit [also rejects the requirement] . . . ." (citations omitted)).
28 Honest services fraud refers to "any scheme or artifice to defraud" by "depriv[ing]
another of the intangible right of honest services" through the use of the mails. 18 U.S.C.
$ 1341, 1346 (2006).
2o For examples of these precedents, see United States v. Weybrauch, 548 F.3d 1237,
1248 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court's exclusion of evidence against a member
of the Alaska House of Representatives and holding that the honest services mail fraud
statute "establishes a uniform standard for 'honest services' that governs every public official"), vacated 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169
(11th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court's exclusion of evidence against an elected
member of the Board of County Commissioners and noting that "[e]lected officials generally owe a fiduciary duty to the electorate"); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (upholding conviction of former Governor of Illinois); Shushan v.

852

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:845

In sum, the STOCK Act makes an important statutory clarification that members of Congress are fiduciaries who owe the requisite
duties under federal insider trading law. However, we should not misread the STOCK Act as contradicting the majority view or rendering it
entirely moot. Indeed, the Act could be cited as support for the correctness of the majority view-that legislators are not fiduciaries and
thus not covered by the federal ban on insider trading, absent some
statutory override. After all, if the majority view were not seen as correct, why would it have been necessary for Congress to enact the
STOCK Act at all? If, however, the majority view is wrong, it remains
important not to canonize a mistaken understanding of the law.
To that end, I argue that the majority view-that judges could not
recognize legislators as fiduciaries under federal insider trading lawhas been and continues to be wrong.30 Even if the STOCK Act had
not passed and even if it were to be repealed, judges could build on
existing precedents and employ unextraordinary judicial reasoning to
impose the relevant fiduciary duties on both state and federal legislators as required under federal insider trading law.
In Part I, I provide a clean distillation of federal insider trading
law that focuses on the critical element of the violation: the breach of
fiduciary duty. I then explore courts' standard approach in resolving
novel instances of potentially fiduciary relationships: applying traditional analogical reasoning to well-established cases. For centuries,
courts have invoked-either explicitly or implicitly-analogies to
more established fiduciaries as the primary means of deciding hard
cases.
United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (upholding mail fraud prosecution of a
member of a Louisiana parish levee board for receiving kickbacks and noting that "[no
trustee has more sacred duties than a public official").
30 When I refer to the "majority view," I am referring to the opinion or implication
that judges must take extraordinary measures (e.g., ignore or overrtle existing judicial
precedent, or use novel or unusual judicial methods) in order to find legislators actionable
under pre-STOCK Act federal insider trading law. Stated another way, the majority view
that I am challenging is one that suggests that there are greater obstacles to holding legislators liable under federal insider trading law than the mere lack of direct "on point" precedent-the fact that no other court has yet found a legislator to be a fiduciary in an insider
trading case. At the same time., I acknowledge that any attempt to ascribe a "majority view"
label to any cluster of commentators whose characterizations and conclusions are diverse
will be vulnerable to a "straw-man" criticism. No doubt some commentators, which I have
categorized as falling under the "majority view," did not address the precise issue as I have
framed it and were instead asking and answering a slightly different question (e.g., whether
members of Congress were "clear" or "established" fiduciaries). Regardless of the how the
issue has been framed by various commentators, my Article emphasizes two important
points that can't be ignored in the debate. First, the fiduciary category has never been a
fixed one with precise boundaries. Second, the Supreme Court has long referred to analogous duties imposed due to a relation of trust and confidence. This recognition of fiduciary-like relationships signals flexibility in defining the reach of the insider trading
prohibition.
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In Part II, I employ analogical reasoning to make the case that a
fiduciary duty could be found to apply to both federal and state legislators. This would have been true for members of Congress prior to
the passage of the STOCK Act, but more importantly, it remains true
for state legislators who are not now covered by the STOCK Act. My
target audience is the judiciary who may be confronted with just such
a question in a lawsuit. In addition to analogical reasoning, I summon
an impressive body ofjudicial precedent which has recognized public
officials, including state and federal legislators, as fiduciaries outside
of the insider trading context.3 1
Deeper thinkers, whether they be judges or academic commentators, may find the analysis in Part II to be unsatisfyingly thin. They will
likely object that the problem with analogical reasoning is that it is
often conclusory and indeterminate. For example, there is no widely
accepted rule that tells us which of the myriad attributes of a person,
object, or concept are relevant for comparison and how much weight
should be given them.32 Even a zebra and a barber pole are analogous if we are focused on being "striped."33 To make analogies not
merely rhetorically persuasive but also well reasoned, there must be
some appeal, explicit or implicit, to the underlying purpose of the
analogical reasoning.
Part III provides a thicker rationale for recognizing legislators as
fiduciaries for purposes of insider trading law. It more deeply justifies
the analogies made in Part II by identifying a core purpose of fiduciary duty law. Although wildly heterogeneous, fiduciary law holds, as
one of its central principles, an anti-corruption norm, with corruption
(in the public sector) defined as the "use of public office for private
gain."3 4 After explaining why legislator insider trading should be classified as a form of public corruption, I demonstrate the existence of
this anti-corruption norm in fiduciary law by exploring judicial opinions which have proscribed public fiduciaries from using their public
office for private gain. In the end, this analysis reveals an organic
alignment between recognizing legislator insider trading as a breach
of fiduciary duty and one core purpose of the common law of fiduciaries-deterring corruption.
31

Also, I perform an analysis of SEC Rule 10b5-2(b). See infra Part II.C..
See Gregory L. Murphy & Douglas L. Medin, The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, 92 PsYcoHo. REv. 289, 292 (1985) ("The point is that any two entities can be arbitrarily
similar or dissimilar by changing the criterion of what counts as a relevant attribute. Unless one can specify such criteria, then the claim that categorization is based on attribute
matching is almost entirely vacuous. . .
32

3
34

Id.

Part III.B duplicates Part II of Sung Hui Kim, What Governmental Insider Trading
Teaches UsAbout CorporateInsiderTrading, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADNm(Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1, 14-27) [hereinafter Kim,
Governmental Insider Trading] (on file with author).
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In Part IV, I answer objections that the judicial extension of a
federal securities cause of action against legislators would be unwise
or unconstitutional. Specifically, I discuss whether doing so would
amount to judicial activism, violate principles of federalism (with respect to state legislators), or violate the Speech or Debate Clause.35
To clarify, this Article's primary purpose is to determine whether
judges can rely on ordinary judicial reasoning to impose the relevant
fiduciary duties on state and federal legislators under federal insider
trading law and how this might be done. It is not to inquire, on some
blank slate, whether legislator insider trading should be banned on
policy grounds, which is a matter considered in a separate piece.36
For curious readers, I can share that I believe that legislator insider
trading is normatively problematic on consequentialist grounds. But
these policy views are not logically germane to the arguments I make
here.37
I
FEDERAL INSIDER TRAnING LAw

A.

Federal Insider Trading Doctrine

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Section
10(b))3 and SEC Rule lOb-5 (Rule 1Ob-5) 39 promulgated thereunder
by the SEC proscribe fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security."* Although neither the text of Section 10(b) nor that
3
Due to the space constraints of this Article, the objections sounding in separation
of powers or the First Amendment are explored in a separate appendix, which is available
online at the Social Science Research Network. See Sung Hui Kim, Appendix to The Last
Temptation of Congress: LegislaiorInsider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corrption
(Nov. 5, 2012). available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2171336.
36 See generaly Kim, Governmental Insider Trading, supra note 34, at 61 (arguing that
governmental insider trading-including such trading by legislators-inflicts temptation,
distraction, and legitimacy costs, thereby militating in favor of its banning).
3
To clarify this point with an analogy, suppose that I am a chef who wants to publish
a recipe to show how home cooks can make a decadent Southern Chicken Fried Steak. It
is entirely possible for me to write a clear, concise, and delicious recipe, regardless of my
personal views about whether or not people should eat steak prepared in this manner.
Indeed, I can be perfectly agnostic about whether any individual-for health or other reasons-should cook or eat steak without necessarily undermining the quality of the recipe.
In fact, I can rule out steak in my own diet and still write a useful recipe. In short, my
personal normative views about whether anyone should consume steak are not logically germane to the usefulness of my recipe. Further, I can answer objections to the recipe (e.g.,
Why did you include safflower oil in the recipe when coconut oil has a better smoking
point?) with reasons based on policies widely accepted by most chefs, regardless of my own
normative views. For readers curious about my normative views on steak, I can share that I
am a "pescetarian," which is neither here nor there.
3
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (2006).
39 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2012).
40 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) makes it
unlawful for any person purchasing or selling securities "[to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
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of Rule lOb-5 specifically mentions "insider trading," courts and administrative agencies have, for decades, interpreted these provisions
to ban the practice.4 1 In rough terms, 42 the elements of an insider
trading cause of action include: (1) trading on (or tipping) (2) material, (3) nonpublic information (4) in breach of a fiduciary (or fiduciary-like) duty.4 3 These elements, including the fiduciary requirement,
appear nowhere in a statute or administrative regulation. They have

vance." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Similarly, Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated by the SEC
under its regulatory authority granted by Congress under the Exchange Act, provides, inter
alia, that no person may "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or ... engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
41 See,e.g.,United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,651-56 (1997) (discussing theories
of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and the case law surrounding diem).
42 There are, of course, exceptions. The Supreme Court has not strictly adhered to
the idea that the defendant must already be in a fiduciary or fiduciarylike relationship in
order to state a violation. SeeLangevoort, A Post-Chiarella Restatement supra note 10, at 28
("Unlike the trading or tipping insider, the tippee bears no pre-existing fiduciary relationship to the person with whom he trades. The Supreme Court's apparent endorsement of
some tippee liability is an indication that it will not adhere strictly to the idea that only
fiduciaries are obligated to make disclosures when trading."); seealso infra text accompanying notes 383-85 (describing corporate insiders' duty to purchasers of the corporation's
stock). Also, although the Supreme Court has yet to signify its agreement, recent case law
has created a small number of exceptions to the fiduciary duty requirement where the
deception element of Rule 1Ob-5 is otherwise satisfied. See e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d
42, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that breach of fiduciary duty is not necessary in a Section
10(b) enforcement action for computer hacking); Thomas Lee Hazen, Jdentifying the Duty
Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HAsiNos LJ. 881, 885-87
(2010) (discussing "outsider trading" cases where the fiduciary duty requirement has been
relaxed); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Pincples, 94
IowA L REv. 1315, 1336-52 (2009) [hereinafter Nagy, Gradual Demise] (discussing the
"casting aside" of fiduciary duty principles); seealso DoNALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADINo: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENTf& PREVENTION § 6:14, at 6-50 to -52 (2012) (summarizing
exceptions in the case law).
43 Under misappropriation theory, there is an additional element for establishing a
violation-that the defendant failed to disclose to the source the defendant's intention to
trade on the nonpublic information. SeeO'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. To be sure, pretrading
disclosure also precludes liability under the classical theory, but the fact of nondisclosure
under classical theory is redundant to the other elements. Under classical theory, pretrading disclosure to counterparties automatically negates the "breach of fiduciary duty" and
"nonpublic" elements of the cause of action. Under misappropriation theory, pretrading
disclosure to the source does not negate those other elements. Compare Richard W.
Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don't As14Just Tell Insider TradingAfter
United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L REv. 153, 180 (1998) (arguing that disclosure of one's
plan to trade on material, nonpublic information might be enough to negate liability
under classical theory but suggesting that disclosure must include the content of nonpublic
information in order to do so), with Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading
Regime, 99 CoLuM. L. REv. 1491, 1491 (1999) (arguing that mere disclosure of one's plan to
trade on material, nonpublic information negates liability under the classical theory by
negating the deception element).
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been almost entirely judicially manufactured, albeit with considerable
congressional endorsement, if not ratification.
What follows is a simplified review of the elements of an insider
trading cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.4* The
first three elements pose no special hurdle if the defendant happens
to be a legislator. It is the fourth element that is controversial.
1.

Trading on (or Tipping) Material Nonpublic Information

The first element-that the defendant "traded on the information" in question-requires a showing that the defendant possessed
the material nonpublic information at the time he or she made the
securities trade. 4 6 Possession at the time of trading is often difficult to
establish, but, once proven, there is usually no further question that
the defendant traded in order to exploit the informational advantage
vis-A-vis other marketplace traders.4 7
In the typical case, the required mens rea for liability-scienter 48-is not difficult to establish.49 To prove scienter, the complainant must show that the "defendant knew that the information was
material and nonpublic or recklessly disregarded facts that would indicate that the information in his possession was material and nonpublic."50 For criminal prosecutions, which are brought by the
Department ofJustice, the defendant must have "willfully" committed
the offense.51 Courts have construed "willfully" to refer to violations
that occur with some "realization on the defendant's part that he was
44 Legislative histories of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 suggest that Congress had endorsed (if not ratified) the multiple bases of liability pursued by the SEC and approved by
the courts. See Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VANo. L. Rev. 1273, 1274 (1984); Steve Thel, Statutory
Fndings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VANo. L. REv. 1091. 1118-21 (1997).
45 This Article does not cover two areas of regulation commonly associated with the
goal of deterring insider trading: section 16(b) (the "short swing" profits rule) and SEC
Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange Act (relating to tender offers).
46 See, e.g., SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1340 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Scienter necessarily
requires that the insider have possession of material nonpublic information at the time the
insider trades.").
47 LANGEvooer, supra note 42, § 3:13, at 3-32.
48 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining "scienter" as
"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
49 LANGEVOORT, supra note 42, § 3:13, at 3-32. In 2000, in order to resolve confusion
in the case law about motivation and state of mind, the SEC adopted Rule lOb5-1, which
clarified that trading on material, nonpublic information was unlawful where the defendant trades "on the basis of" material, nonpublic information, defined as trading "when
the person in question was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person
made the purchase or sale." Id. § 3:14, at 3-38 (quotations omitted). That said, some
courts have not deferred much to the Rule. Id. § 3:14, at 3-39.
50
Id. § 5:5, at 5-25.
51
Id. § 8:13, at 842 to -43.

2013]

THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CONGRESS

857

doing a wrongful act ... and that the knowingly wrongful act involved
52
a significant risk of effecting the violation that occurred."
The defendant can, of course, argue that the trade in question
was made for reasons unrelated to the information in question. For
example, the defendant might insist that the trade would have happened regardless of the information because it was necessary to liquidate assets to pay upcoming bills. If the defendant makes such a
showing, courts may not find liability, especially in those jurisdictions
requiring that the defendant use (and not merely possess) the
information.ss
The prohibition covers not only trading but also the practice of
tipping, as well as trading on the tip, as detailed below. For the most
part, how this element gets resolved is substantively no different because the defendant happens to bear the title of Senator or
Representative.5 4
The second element-that the confidential information be "material"-also presents no new legal issues. Information is deemed "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider it important in making an investment decision.55 In
effect, any information the disclosure of which would likely change an
issuer's securities prices will generally be regarded as material.
With respect to contingent or forward-looking information, materiality is judged by "a balancing of both the indicated probability that
the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in
light of the totality of the company activity."56 Accordingly, if a legislator trades to profit from an anticipated legislative development, the
factfinder must assess the likelihood (at the time of the trade) that the
legislative event would come to pass and the importance of that event
to an issuer's business (at the time of the trade).
In theory, this would be a difficult task because most legislative
developments (such as the sudden passage of the STOCK Act bill in
2012) are tough to predict, given the dynamics and vicissitudes of lawmaking. In practice, however, assessing "materiality" is often not so
arduous. The very fact of trading by the defendant may support a
finding of materiality. If the factfinder is persuaded that the defendant traded in the hopes of profiting from the information in question and that the defendant resembles a "reasonable investor," then
Id. § 8:13, at 8-43.
See id. § 3:13, at 3-34 to -35, for a discussion of those jurisdictions which adhere to
the "use" and not the "possession" standard.
54 That said, there may be some evidentiary difficulties that arise from the Speech or
Debate Clause. See infra Part IV.C.
5 See TSC Indus. v. Nortbway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
56
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)).
52
53
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57

the test of materiality is effectively satisfied.
Finally, the defendant
will generally have a hard time convincing the factfinder that the information in question is not material in the face of the actual occurrence of the legislative event and its resulting impact on the issuer's
securities prices.58 If securities prices change dramatically following
the public release of the information in question, the element of materiality is presumptively satisfied.59
The third element-that the information in question must be
"nonpublic"-also poses no novel issues. Information is considered
nonpublic if it is not generally available to the investing public-that
is, it has not been broadly disseminated.co This element is rarely seriously contested in insider trading cases. With respect to the securities
of an issuer with a large analyst following, once the information in
question gets into the hands of a large number of investors (or a
smaller number of institutional investors who direct a large volume of
trades), the security's market price will rapidly reflect the significance
of that information, thereby extinguishing the opportunity to profit
from insider trading. As a result, it is difficult to generate quick profits by trading in such a security unless one holds information that the
general investing public does not know.61
To avoid any confusion, it is important to understand that the
requisite nonpublic information is not narrowly circumscribed to "inside information"-information that emanates directly from within
the corporation and specifically relates to the plans, operations, or
assets of the issuer whose securities are being traded. 62 Nonpublic information also encompasses "market information," which emanates
from a source outside the issuer of the traded securities and tends to be
about the supply of and demand for the company's securities.6 3 Mar57 See LANGEvooRT, supra note 42, at § 5:2, 5-3 to -4.
58 Naturally, judges and juries will have a tough time concluding that an event was
improbable at the time of trading if they know that the event has in fact occurred. SeeMitu
Gulati,Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraudby Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REV.
773, 774 (2004) ("Even in the absence of any misconduct, a bad outcome alone might lead
people to believe that corporate managers committed securities fraud.").
59 Cf LANGEvoorr, supra note 42, § 5:2, at 511 to -12 ("If a major market movement
promptly follows the formal release to the public of the information in question, the materiality test is presumptively satisfied.").
60 Id. at § 5:4, at 5-19.
61

Id.

62 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages Under the Feral
Securities Laws, 93 Hanv. L. REv. 322, 329 (1979) (discussing how "corporate" and "market"
information both fall under the insider trading laws).
6s Id. (defining "market information" as concerning outside "transactions in a corporation's securities that will have an impact on their future price quite apart from expected
changes in the corporation's earnings or assets"). See Roberta S. Karmel, Book Review,
The RelationshipBetumen Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading Why a
Pwpen" mghts Theory ofInside InformationIs Untenable, 59 BRooK. L. REv. 149, 154 (1993), for
the distinction between "inside" and "market" information.
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ket information may be information that impacts the prices of the specfic security that is being traded (e.g., "information that an investment
adviser will shortly issue a 'buy' recommendation or that a large stockholder is seeking to unload his shares or that a tender offer will soon
be made for the company's stock").64 But market information may
also include more generalized information that impacts the share
prices of an entire industry or the stock market as a whole (e.g., Ben
Bernanke's prediction that the entire economy will tank).
Of course, legislators have access to both types of nonpublic information. Through legislators' subpoena power, they may gain access to inside information during the course of a legislative
investigation into the matters of a particular publicly traded company.
Even more easily, they can gain access to market information in the
form of proposed legislation, anticipated criminal investigation, or anticipated governmental action, all of which may impact the securities
prices of a single issuer or an entire industry.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that not all persons coming
into contact with material, nonpublic information are potentially liable. For example, if, during my morning jog, I happen to stumble
across some random trash containing a juicy stock tip and then proceeded to trade on the tip, I would not be liable for insider trading.
Why? It is because of the fourth element, which requires a breach of
fiduciary duty.es In my hypothetical, I have not violated any fiduciary
duty by trading on a random stock tip.6 6
So, what about legislators? Do they owe a fiduciary duty and, if
so, to whom?
2.

In Breach of a Fiduciaty (or Fiduciary-Like) Duty

To decide whether a fiduciary duty exists and has been breached
requires us to distinguish between two accepted theories of insider
trading liability-classical and misappropriation.

64
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see SEC v. Seibald, No. 95 Civ. 2081(LLS), 1997 WL 605114,
at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1997) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment in
an insider trading enforcement action concerning trades made based on an analyst's
report).
65 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (reversing defendant's Section 10(b) conviction because no duty to disclose existed and noting that defendant was
not an "agent [of the target company in a proposed transaction], he was not a fiduciary, he
was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence").
66
If, however, the tip relates to an anticipated tender offer and I purchase shares in
the target company, there is potential liability under Rule 14e-3.
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Classical Theory

Under the classical theory, affirmed in 1980 by the Supreme
Court in Chiarella v. United States,67 a person violates Rule 10b-5 and
Section 10(b) by trading on material, nonpublic information if that
person owes a fiduciary duty (of disclosure) to the counterparty of the
trade (later redefined by statute to extend to one or more contemporaneous traders in the marketplace).6* This fiduciary duty of disclosure (articulated as a "fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain")6 9 does not
arise simply because the trader holds an informational advantage over
the counterparty. After all, the ChiarellaCourt noted that "Section
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure [as would be the case with insider trading], there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak."70 Therefore, drawing from the common law
tort of misrepresentation, the Court maintained that a duty to disclose
material, nonpublic information prior to trading "arises when one
party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or othersimilarrelationof trust and confidence between
them.'"71

The Court did not elaborate on what constitutes a "similar relation of trust and confidence." However, courts have long used that
and similar phrases to describe relationships that were not strictly fiduciary as a matter of law but nonetheless shared some of the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship (such as one party's reposing of
confidences in another)72 and thus warranted some of the protections
67 445 U.S. at 235.
68 By passing section 20A of the Exchange Act, Congress granted an express private
right of action to those investors trading contemporaneously with the insider trader. As a
result, contemporaneous traders who bought or sold stock in the opposite position of the
defendant trader may sue the insider trader for damages. Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2006). On Section 20A, see
LANGEVOORT, supra note 42, § 9.3, at 9-9.
69 The fiduciary duty of disclosure under classical theory has long been articulated as
a duty to "disclose or abstain"-either to disclose the material nonpublic information to
the investing public beforetrading or to abstain from trading while such nonpublic information remains undisclosed. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968). But because most defendants do not have a right to disclose confidential information, it is most often "the failure to abstain from trading, rather than the nondisclosure,
which is the basis for imposing liability." Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider TradingRegulation:
The Path Dependent Chwice Between Pmnperq Rights and Securities Fraud,52 SMU L. REv. 1589,
1616 (1999) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Path Dependent Choice].
70 Chierella, 445 U.S. at 234-35.
71 Id. at 228 (emphasis added); see id at 230 (noting that silence in connection with
the sale of securities is only actionable as fraud if there is already a duty to disclose).
72 See, e.g., Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 364 P.2d 247, 252 (Cal. 1961)
("The prerequisite ofa confidential relationship is the reposing of trust and confidence by
one person in another who is cognizant of this fact.").
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In an influential
generally applicable to fiduciary relationships.
opinion, United States v. Chestman,74 the Second Circuit held that a "relationship of trust and confidence" must be the "functional equivalent
of a fiduciary relationship" and must "share the essential characteristics of a fiduciary association."75 Because there is much overlap between fiduciary relationships and such other fiduciary-like
relationships, and the distinction is relevant mostly for allocating burdens of proof,76 whenever I refer to "fiduciary duty," I mean to include analogous duties imposed due to a relation of trust and
confidence.
Who owes a fiduciary duty to contemporaneous traders in the
marketplace? The ChiarellaCourt suggested that those under a duty
to place shareholder welfare before their own are covered by this fiduciary duty.77 As a consequence, the duty applies uncontroversially to
traditional corporate insiders (i.e., an issuer's officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders), as the Court specifically acknowledged.78
The duty also applies uncontroversially to employees and to the corporate issuer itself." Hence, courts and commentators commonly assumed that the classical theory espoused in Chiarellaonly concerned
the trading by corporate insiders.
However, the Court never stated that only corporate insiders
could be held liable.80 Indeed, the ChiarellaCourt approvingly cited

73 See Eileen A. Scallen, PromisesBroken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the
New FiduciaryPrinciple,1993 U. L.. L. REv. 897, 906-07 (1993) (discussing the distinction
between "fiduciary" relationships and nonfiduciary but confidential ones).
74 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
75 Id. at 568.
76 See Scallen, supra note 73, at 907 ("[A] key distinction between confidential and
fiduciary relationships appears to center on whether a party seeking redress must prove
reliance on the other party.").
77 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) ("Application of a duty to
disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to
place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.").
78 Id. at 227 (noting that the duty "has been traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961))).
79 Therefore, if a legislator happens to be moonlighting as a corporate insider, then
the duty would uncontroversially apply to him in his capacity as a corporate insider. Because many state legislative positions are part time, one would expect to find at least a few
such cases. With respect to members of Congress, however, such situations would be rare
because members of Congress are statutorily prohibited from "serv[ing] for compensation
as an officer or member of the board of any association, corporation, or other entity." 5
U.S.C. § 502 (2006); Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 9, at 290.
80 See Chiarelks, 445 U.S. at 228 (stating only that there is "a relationship of trust and
confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation").
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Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,"' an earlier Supreme Court
opinion which imposed Rule lOb-5 liability on defendants who were
not corporate insiders of the issuer of the traded securities. Moreover, as ChiefJustice Burger pointed out in his dissent in Chiarella,Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 literally reach "any person" who engages "in
any fraudulent scheme" 2 in connection with a securities transaction.
Accordingly, no one-not even a member of Congress-is categorically exempt from liability under these provisions.
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC made two important
extensions. First, it announced that this fiduciary duty may apply to
certain confidential advisers of the issuer, such as underwriters, attorneys, accountants, or consultants, who are classified as "temporary" or
"constructive" insiders.83 "The basis for recognizing this fiduciary
duty," the Court clarified, "is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business
of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes." 4 The Court further clarified that "[f]or such a duty
to be imposed .. . the corporation must expect the outsider to keep
the disclosed[,] nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty."8 5 Therefore, if a legislator happens to be advising a corporation in a manner that would imply a duty
to keep confidences, then the fiduciary duty to disclose (prior to trading) would uncontroversially apply to that legislator, who would be
regarded as a fiduciary vis-ft-vis the corporation's shareholders.
Second, Dirks extended insider trading liability to cover the practice of tipping and trading on the tip.8 * But it did so by predicating
the tipper's and tippee's liability on the tipper's breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which includes the duty not to use entrusted information for personal gain.87 Specifically, if the tipper breaches the
fiduciary duty of loyalty by passing on information to the tippee in
anticipation of a personal benefit (broadly defined) 88 and the tippee
81 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (holding that two bank managers violated Rule 10b-5 for buying and re-selling stock in their individual capacities and based on the implicit undertaking
to act in the best interest of the selling shareholders). Affiliated Ute Citizens is cited in
Chiarella. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 229-30.
82
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240.
83 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
84 Id
85

86

Id.

Id. at 659.
Id. at 659-60.
88 The type of personal benefit that may satisfy the Dirks test includes pecuniary benefit, reputational benefit, and the benefit that accrues to oneself when making a gift. See
LANGEVOORT, Stfa note 42. § 4:3, at 4-5 to -6.
87

THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CONGRESS

2013]

863

89

knows or has reason to know of the tipper's breach, then the tippee
inherits the duty owed by the tipper. As the Court explained, "[tihe
tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the [tipper's] breach of a fiduciary duty.""
As a result, any subsequent trading by the tippee will subject both the
tippee and the tipper to liability.
To be clear, there is no liability for either the tipper or tippee
unless the tipper is already in a fiduciary relationship with the corporation's shareholders and thus owes the requisite fiduciary duty. Hence,
the tipper's duty uncontroversially applies to corporate insiders and
temporary insiders (as Dirks expressly contemplated). In addition, any
person to whom the insider improperly passes information inherits
that duty. Therefore, if a legislator knowingly receives an improper
tip from a corporate insider, then the legislator inherits the fiduciary
duty owed by the corporate insider. Consequently, the legislator may
not then trade on the tip or tip the information to someone else.
As in Chiarella,the Dirks Court did not foreclose the possibility of
classifying legislators as fiduciaries. It noted:
We were explicit in Chiarellain saying that there can be no duty to
disclose where the person who has traded on inside information
"was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a fiduciary, [or] was
not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their
trust and confidence."91
In this passage, the Court separately catalogues the corporation's
agent, fiduciary, and the person in whom trust and confidence had
been placed. This separately itemized list clarifies that "agents" and
"fiduciaries" are not redundant or coextensive categories under the
classical theory. Therefore, legislators, who are neither the corporation's nor its shareholders' agents, are not categorically excluded.
b.

MisappripriationTheory

Under the alternative "misappropriation theory," which the Supreme Court endorsed in 1997 in United States v. O'Hagan,92 a person
may not trade on material, nonpublic information entrusted to that
person by the source of that information without disclosing to that
source the person's intention to trade on that information. 3 Drawing
on the common law of agency," the Court held that "a fiduciary's
89
90
91
92

Diks, 463 U.S. at 659-61.
Id. at 659 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (alterations in original) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222).

521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997).

hL at 652.
A
94 See iL at 654-55 (referring to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcy §§ 390, 395
(1958), on an "agent's disclosure obligation regarding use of confidential information").
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undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,"
constitutes deception under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 because
such trading "defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information."95 Thus, liability under the misappropriation theory is premised on a preexisting fiduciary relationship between the trader and
the source "who entrusted him with access to confidential information,"9 6 regardless of whether the source bought or sold securities or
was even a market participant at all.
In addition, lower courts have extended insider trading liability
to ban the practice of tipping and trading on the tip under the misappropriation theory, although the law is not entirely settled in this
area.9 7 Therefore, if a corporate lawyer improperly tips to a legislator
confidential client information that impacts the securities of the client's competitor, then the legislator inherits the fiduciary duty owed
by the lawyer to his firm's client. As a result, the legislator may not
then trade (in the competitor's securities)98 on the tip or tip the information to someone else.
Now that I have introduced both classical and misappropriation
theories, notice the critical difference between them as to whom the
requisite duty is owed. Under classical theory, the defendant (as
buyer or seller) owes the requisite fiduciary duty to the counterparty
to the trade (as seller or buyer). By contrast, under the misappropriation theory, the defendant owes the requisite fiduciary duty to the
source-the person or entity who entrusted the defendant with access
to the confidential information.
There is also an important difference in the nature of the duty
implicated. Under Chiarella'sclassical theory, the relevant duty is the
duty to disclose,99 which courts have routinely and widely imposed on
all fiduciaries. By contrast, in both tipping 00 and misappropriation
95 Id. at 652.
96 Id. For the source to "entrust" a person with access to confidential information
does not strictly require that the source place the information in the fiduciary's hands or
even authorize access to the confidential information. LANGEVOORT, supranote 42, § 6:4,
at 6-13 n.1.
97
Courts have differed on whether all of the Dirs elements (relating to tipping and
trading on the tip) apply in the misappropriation context. CompareSEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d
1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (insisting that standards for tipper-tippee liability are the same
under misappropriation theory as under classical theory), adth SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp.
1028, 1038 n.4 (1989) ("The misappropriation theory of liability does not require a showing of a benefit to the tipper . . . .").
8 To be sure, the legislator is also proscribed from trading in the law firm's client's
securities, but that issue is easily handled by the classical theory (as extended by Dirks).
99 See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
100
Bainbridge, Path Dependent Choice, supra note 69, at 1615 ("[T]he duty at issue in
tipping cases is not a duty to disclose, but rather a duty to refrain from self-dealing in
confidential information owed by the tipper to the source of the information.").
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theory cases,
the relevant obligation is the duty not to use entrusted
information for personal gain,o 2 the precise scope of which has varied among different courts and different fiduciary contexts. 0
Also, I should clarify the positive law source of the requisite fiduciary duty. Although there was once much debate and uncertainty
about this issue,1o4 it is now clear that the federal insider trading prohibition, which may be "classified within the genus of federal conmon
law,"' 05 has a federal source. 0 That said, as with other questions arising under the federal laws, state common law is relevant to and has
informed the task of identifying the requisite federal fiduciary duty
under federal insider trading law.'o
Finally, it is worth noting the implications of tying federal insider
trading law to the fiduciary principle. By choosing to condition liabil101 SeeNagy, GradualDemise,supra note 42, at 1360-61 ("O'Hagan,however, made clear
that it is the insider trader's undisclosed breach of trust and loyalty-and not merely his
breach of confidentiality-that constitutes the fraud under Rule 10b-5.").
102 This duty has different articulations and can be found in the penumbrae of other
explicit duties. See REsrATEMENT (TDn) OF AGENCY § 8.01, 8.02 & cmts. c, d, 8.04, 8.05
(2006); RESTATEMENT (TERD) OF TRusrs § 5 cmt. a, illus. g (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OFTHE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERs § 60(2) & cmt.j (1998); Am. LAw INsTrE, PIuNCIPLES OF
CORORATE GovERNANCE: ANADsS AND RECOMMENDATIONs § 5.04 (1992); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) or AGENCY §§ 387, 388 & cmt. c, 393, 395 (1958); 1 FLOYD R. MECHEM, LAw oF

AGENCY §§ 1189, 1191, 1209, 1224 (2d ed. 1914).
103 See e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 188-96 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing the
jurisdictions' differing holdings before ultimately holding that there is no recovery unless
the corporation can show injury from insider trading); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739,
741-46 (Fla. 1975) (same); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (stating that a corporate fiduciary entrusted with valuable information may not appropriate
that information for the fiduciary's own use even when doing so causes no injury to the
corporation); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Del. Ch. 1948) (noting that loss to
the employer need not be alleged where the employee breached fiduciary duty for trading
on confidential information about employer corporation).
104 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, IncorporatingState Law FiduciaryDuties into the
FederalInsider Trading Pakibition, 52 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1189, 1192 (1995); Theresa A.
Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of FederalSecurities Regulation,
20 . CoRP. L. 155, 212-13 (1994).
105 STEPHEN M. BAINBUDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcoNoMIcs 556 (2002).
106 Cf Iman Anabtawi, Secrt Compensation,82 N.C. L. REv. 835,863-64 (2004) (observing that the Supreme Court suggested a federal fiduciary law source underlying the federal
insider trading prohibition).
107 See BAINtuDGE, supra note 105, at 556 (reviewing cases in which courts relied upon
state law to resolve questions arising under federal securities laws and concluding that "the
question is not whether state law is relevant to the task of defining insider trading, but
rather the extent to which it should be incorporated into the federal prohibition").
For insider trading cases where federal courts expressly consulted state law on the fiduciary
issue, see, for example, SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (looking to
Delaware state law to support the proposition that a director owes a fiduciary duty to the
director's corporation); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 76 (1st Cir. 2000) (looking to Massachusetts state law to support the proposition that sole shareholders of a closely held corporation owe fiduciary duties to each other); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that marriage does not create a per se fiduciary relationship in
New York).
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ity on the breach of fiduciary duty, the Chiarella Court selected "an
evolving, dynamic concept which [by its nature] ... cannot be rigidly
categorized."108 In 1982, Donald Langevoort presciently observed:
"[W] ithin the broad outlines of the [Chiarella] Court's rationale, there
is room for creative interpretation, permitting the law to continue to
develop in accord with perceptions about fairness in the securities
marketplace. The flexibility of the fiduciary principle should not be
underestimated."'" With these clarifications, the fundamental question becomes: is a legislator in a fiduciary relationship to either the
counterparties of the trade (as under classical theory) or to the person who entrusted the nonpublic information to him (as under the
misappropriation theory)? To make this case, we must first understand how courts have determined who is a fiduciary.
B.

The Modus Operandi of Courts

Whether a particular defendant falls into the category "fiduciary"
will often be an easy question, given clear precedent on point. For
example, under the classical theory, courts regard officers, directors,
controlling shareholders, employees, and the corporation itself as fiduciaries vis-A-vis shareholders based on well-established precedents."t0 Under the misappropriation theory, courts treat defendants
involved in "hornbook fiduciary relations,""' such as employer-employee, principal-agent, or client-attorney, as fiduciaries. But what
about harder, novel cases?
Recall that in Chiarella, the Court predicated insider trading liability under the classical theory on the finding of a duty to disclose,
which arises out of a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence" between the parties to a transaction.11 2 While the phrase
"trust and confidence" signaled the Court's intention to recognize a
broader class of relationships than strictly fiduciary ones, it regrettably
told us little more.
Three years later, in Dirks, the Supreme Court extended the fiduciary category to cover certain recipients of confidential information
as temporary insiders. But the Court did so not by identifying key
attributes of fiduciaries generally. Instead, it emphasized that there
must be an implicit understanding on the part of the issuer of the
traded securities that the recipient of the information will use that
108 See Scallen, supra note 73, at 902.
109 Langevoort, A Post-Chiarella Restatement, supra note 10, at 53.
110 See, e.g, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980) (summarizing
precedents).
112 Chestmka 947 F.2d at 568.
112 Chiarela, 445 U.S. at 228.
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information solely for the issuer's benefit and will keep it
confidential.is
Finally, fourteen years later, in O'Hagan,the Supreme Court embraced the misappropriation theory but did so without any further
elaboration of how to identify the existence of a fiduciary relationship." 4 Although it "referenced the term 'fiduciary' seventeen
times,"115 it did little more than point out that the misappropriation
theory "is limited to those who breach a recognized duty."116
Given minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, lower federal
courts have produced decisions that run the gamut. Some courts have
examined the "reasonable and legitimate" expectations of the parties
and have inquired as to whether those parties had "a history or practice of sharing business confidences, and [whether] those confidences
generally were maintained."' 17 Some courts have recognized a relationship of trust and confidence where the trader has "expressly
agreed" to keep the information in question confidential;'" others
have concluded that such an agreement of confidentiality, standing
alone, is not enough."x9
Some courts have highlighted factors emphasizing imbalance in
the relationship, such as "dominance" and "superior influence," 20 or
113 See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. Subsequent lower courts interpreting
Dirks have clarified that the rcipient must have expressly or impliedly assented to such
duties. e, e.g., SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1050-51 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that
mere receipt of nonpublic information is not enough to establish insider trading liability if
the recipient is not in a fiduciary relationship), rev'd and remanded, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir.
2008); SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (interpreting Dirksas
requiring that the recipient "must have expressly or impliedly entered into a fiduciary relationship with the issuer"). But see SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(suggesting-more liberally-that a fiduciary relationship vis-4-vis the issuer's shareholders
is created when the recipient ofconfidential information "knew or should have known that
the information he received was confidential and that it had been disclosed to him solely
for legitimate corporate purposes").
114 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650, 652 (1997).
115 Nagy, GradualDemise, spm note 42, at 1332.
116 O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 666.
117
SEC. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2003).
118 See, e.g., SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Mass. 2009); SEC v. Lyon,
529 F. Supp. 2d, 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D.
IlL. 2003).
119 See, eg., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that "an
express or implied promise merely to keep information confidential" is not enough to
create a relationship of trust and confidence; rather, the agreement should also "impose
on the party who receives the information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or
otherwise using the information for personal gain"), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
120 Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568
(2d Cir. 1991)) (rejecting the finding of a fiduciary-like relationship for relationships
among equals); see United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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1 21

"de facto control and dominance."
Still others have focused more
broadly on the granting of some form of "discretionary authority" and
a resulting "dependency" or reliance, 22 and so on. With such vagueness and variance in working definitions, it should not be surprising to
find that federal courts have recognized a strikingly diverse array of
persons as fiduciaries, including an electrician who traded on information overheard on the job, 23 a member of a business round table
who traded on information learned from a fellow member,124 and a
government affairs consultant who tipped information learned from a
Treasury Department briefing.125 In sum, in deciding whether to impose a fiduciary duty for purposes of federal insider trading law, federal courts tend to invoke an ad hoc list of imprecise factors with no
clear weightings and no clear explanation as to why the posited factors
are relevant.
This approach is largely consistent with how state courts have for
centuries determined new fiduciaries. Instead of deploying a widely
accepted, precise, and rule-like definition, state courts also invoke an
ad hoc list of vague factors. Not surprisingly, the universe of fiduciaries has gradually expanded to include such strange bedfellows as
marriage brokerage agencies, 26 commercial developers of inventions,1 27 psychiatrists,' 2 8 life tenants of property,12o and private hospitals.'" As a consequence, experts have described fiduciary law as
121
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125
(2d Cir. 1982)).
122 See, e.g., SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Chestman, 947
F. 2d at 569); United States v. Victor Teicher& Co., L.P., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1148 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (citing Chestman, 947 F. 2d at 567).
123 Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
124 SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
125 SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (D. Mass. 2009).
126 Fox v. Encounters Int'l, No. 05-1139, No 05-1404, 2006 WL 952317, at *5-6 (4th
Cir. Apr. 13, 2006) (upholding a jury finding that a marriage brokerage agency who recommended a physically abusive husband was a fiduciary of the woman).
127 Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.3d 976,983-84 (7th Cir. 1978) (recognizing
sufficient evidence of a confidential relationship between the commercial developer/employer and the inventor/employee); Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d 669, 678-79 (Cal Dist. Ct.
App. 1956) (recognizing a fiduciary relationship between the inventor and commercial
developer of the invention). But see City of Hope Nat. Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 181
P.3d 142, 150 (Cal. 2008) (finding no fiduciary relationship between a medical research
center and a biotechnology company despite the parties having entered a contract); Wolf
v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860, 865 (Cal. Ct. App, 2003) (finding no fiduciary
relationship between a movie studio and a novelist despite the parties having entered a
contract).
128 MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D. 2d 482,482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding psychiatrists to be fiduciaries in regards to confidential information).
1 Leonard S. Sealy, Fiduciay Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 77-78 (1962).
1Io Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 823 (N.J. 1963) (holding that a hospital's power to exclude a physician from user-privileges was to "be viewed judicially as a
fiduciary power to be exercised in reasonable and lawful manner for the advancement of
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132

"amorphous,"
"intrinsically non-rational,"
"ill-defined," 3 3
136
37
"messy,"'3 "atomistic,"'a "slippery,"
"protean,"1 "confused," 38
39
40
"problematic,"
"result-oriented,"o and "elusive."x4
In highlighting the indeterminacy of the judicial task of identifying fiduciaries, I am not suggesting that courts are reaching conclusions without reasoning. In fact, courts often rely on forms of
analogical reasoning and compare-either implicitly' 42 or explicitlythe defendant's situation to instances where fiduciary status is well established. For example, when courts originally encountered members
of a corporation's board of directors, they explicitly analogized the
directors to private trustees, 43 agents,'44 or partners's-familiar instances of fiduciaries. Of course, over time, courts came to regard
directors themselves as uncontroversial fiduciaries. 46 As fiduciary law
the interests of the medical profession and the public generally" (quoting Falcone v. Middlesex Cnty. Med. Serv., 170 A.2d 791, 799 (N.J. 1961))).
131 Scallen, supra note 73, at 902.
132 J. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAw oF FIDucIAREs 3 (1981)
s33 P. D. FINN, FIDUctRY OauGATIoNs 1 (1977).
134 D. Gordon Smith, The Cntical Resource Theory of Fiduciay Duty, 55 VAND. L REV.
1399, 1400 (2002).
135 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis ofFiduciaryObligation, 1988 DuKE
L.J 879, 915 [hereinafter DeMott, Beyond Metaphor].
136 PeterJ. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On Peritonitis Preemption,and the Elusive Goal
of Managed CareAccountability, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 767, 771 n.6 (2001).
13
LEONARD . RomAN, FmucanAy LAw 2 (2005).
18
Leonard I Rotman, Fiducieay Laws "Holy Grail": Reconciling Theory and Practice in
FiduciaryJurisprudence,91 B.U. L. REv. 921, 922 (2011).
139
140
141
142

Id.

Id. at 924.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 135, at 879.
Courts implicitly invoke analogies when referring to an ad hoc list of factors or attributes deemed to be relevant for determining whether the defendant is a fiduciary.
143
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposalfor Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179, 193 (1991) (noting that 'in older cases, the position of a
corporate insider has been analogized to that of a trustee" and citing cases); see also Farwell
v. Pyle-Nat'l Electric Headlight Co., 124 N.E. 449, 452 (Ill. 1919) (holding that the director
was not entitled to retain profits from a self-dealing transaction because directors "occupy
the position of trustees for the collective body of stockholders"); People ex rel Manice v.
Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) ('The relation of the directors to the stockholders is
essentially that of trustee and cestui que trust.').
144 See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 A. 34
(Ch.) at 42-43 (discussing how directors are agents for certain purposes).
145 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (noting that stockholders
and directors in a close corporation owe each other a duty of loyalty as rigorous as that of
partners).
146 See e.g. Boyer v. Wilmington Materials. Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 907 (Del. Ch. 1999)
("[D]irectors of corporations organized under Delaware law owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporations upon whose boards they serve and to the stockholders of those corporations."
(quoting 1 DAVID A. DRExLER ET AL., DELAWARE CoRPoRATIoN IAw AND PRACTICE § 15.02
(1997) (alteration in original))); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and directors ... stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders."); Schafthauser v. Arnholt & Schaefer Brewing Co., 67 A. 417, 417 (Pa. 1907)
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scholars have observed, analogies have played an especially crucial
role in the development of fiduciary law.' 47 Indeed, the most cited
case in fiduciary law, Meinhard v. Salmon, involved an explicit analogy
to partners.xas As Deborah DeMott has noted, the "pervasiveness and
persistence" of the use of analogies in the fiduciary context "suggest
that it is an inevitable aspect of fiduciary analysis." 49
So, if ajudge is presented with the question, "Are legislators fiduciaries?," how might that judge approach it? One way is to invoke
plausible analogies.
II
LEGISLATORS AS FIDUCIARIES

A.

Theoretical Outlines

The question of whether a legislator is a "fiduciary" always embeds an ancillary question: fiduciary to whom? Consider the following
potential beneficiaries: citizens, the legislature (and fellow legislators), and the government that the legislator serves.' 50 Depending on
the beneficiary, a particular theory of liability applies. For example,
suppose that the beneficiaries are the citizens whom the legislator represents but with whom the legislator has no personal contact. As a
general matter, it is unlikely that legislators are receiving juicy stock
tips from ordinary citizens. However, when legislators trade on material, nonpublic information, some of those trading counterparties will
be citizens. This suggests that for citizens, the classical theory of liability is relevant. One can then analogize the legislator-citizen relationship to more established fiduciary relationships, for example, the
relationship between a trustee and beneficiaries of the trust. The following schematic summarizes the potential fiduciary relationships and
potential analogies that judges could employ:
("[T]here can be no doubt [that the director] does occupy such a fiduciary relation ... that he shall manage the business of the company in such a manner as to promote ... the common interests of all the shareholders.").
147 See EvanJ. Criddle, FiduciaryFoundationsofAdministrative Law, 54 UCIA L REV. 117,
125 (2006) ("Courts have eschewed formalistic criteria for identifying fiduciary relations
and instead reason by analogy to paradigmatic relations . . . ."); DeMott, Beyond Metaphor,
supra note 135, at 879, 891 ("The evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates,
perhaps more powerfully than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumentation."); Tamar Frankel, Fiducimy Law, 71 CAuF. L REv. 795, 804 (1983) (discussing
courts' practice of analogizing new fiduciary relations to existing prototypes); Scallen,
supra note 73, at 905 ("[T]he use of analogy is the means by which most innovations in
fiduciary law 'traditionally' have been created.").
148 Meinhard 164 N.E. at 546 ("Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another ... the duty of the finest loyalty.").
149 DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 135, at 891.
150 Notice that the STOCK Act explicitly states that members of Congress owe a fiduciary duty "to the Congress, the United States Government, and the citizens of the United
States." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g)(1) (2011).
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TABLE 1: POTENTIAL FIDucIARY RELATIONSHIPS

#

BENEFICIARY

I

citizens

THEORY OF LIABILITY

ANALOGY

classical

private trustee;
director
(to shareholders)

2

2

3
B.

fellow legislators

legislature,

misappropriation
misappropriation

partner
partner

government

misappropriation

director
(to corporation)

Fiduciary to Citizens

Are legislators fiduciaries to citizens under classical theory? If so,
then a legislator who trades on material, nonpublic information may
be breaching a duty to disclose to those "citizen-investors" on the
other side of the trade.15 Alternatively, under Dirks, a legislator who
151
Some counterparties will be citizens of the nation (for members of Congress) or
domiciled in a particular state (for that state's legislators). Of course, not every
counterparty will have a special relationship to the legislator. For example, the
counterparties of federal legislators could be foreign investors to whom no fiduciary duty is
owed or the counterparties of state legislators could be investors domiciled in other states.
However, at least some counterparties will be fellow citizens of the legislator. The notion
that government officials are fiduciaries to citizens in the context of insider trading has
been suggested by other scholars. See LANEvooR, supa" note 42, § 3:9, 3-20 to -22; Krimmel, supm note 10, at 1503-04; Nagy, Congressional Officials, supra note 10, at 1140-47.
Nagy proposes two theories by which members of Congress could be deemed fiduciaries under classical theory: constructive insiders and public fiduciaries to "citizen-investors." In my view, the first theory is limited and unpersuasive, which Nagy partially
concedes. Recall that in Disd, the Supreme Court extended who counts as a fiduciary beyond traditional insiders to "constructive insiders," such as lawyers, accountants, or underwriters. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). Pointing to legislative history of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Nagy suggests that Congress happily acknowledged
the Dirk extension and listed "government officials" as a potential category that could be
pursued, in addition to the "underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant." Nagy, Congressional Officials, supranote 10, at 1140. Nagy concludes that adding members of Congress to
this list "fits well within the classical framework" and that it would "be quite reasonable to
impute a disclosure obligation" to members of Congress. Id.
This "constructive insider" theory suffers from two weaknesses. First, as Nagy acknowledges, id at 1142, this theory cannot apply to various instances of legislator insider trading.
For example, if a member of Congress trades based on his nonpublic knowledge of imminent tax code changes, it would be folly to suggest that somehow that member has become
a constructive insider of all those firms whose stock price is thereby affected. Second-and
this is a point not made by Nagy-all the temporary or constructive insiders identified in
Diks were in clear principal-agent relationships, often of a textbook nature: hired lawyers,
investment bankers, and accountants. Put another way, these constructive insiders were
paid to give advice to the issuer. One cannot suggest that legislators are literally hired in
this manner or figuratively stand in some similar consulting relationship. Regardless of
how generously one weights verbiage in Committee Reports, a casual insertion of the term
"government officials" cannot counter this fundamental difference. For these reasons, legislators cannot be considered to be constructive insiders on the authority of Dists.
By contrast, Nagy's second theory regarding "citizen-investors" holds promise, although my defense is based on different grounds.
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tips such information to friends or relatives may be breaching the duty
not to use information entrusted to that legislator to benefit citizens
for personal gain.' 52
1.

Analogy: Private Trustee

We can analogize the relationship between the legislator and citizens to the relationship between the trustee and beneficiaries of a private trust.s53 In the prototypical Anglo-American trust, the settlor
contracts with the trustee to manage a portfolio of assets in the best
interests of the beneficiaries, subject to ex ante conditions imposed by
the settlor in the deed of trust.'5 Accordingly, three important features of a trust are (1) its creation through a manifestation of consent
by the settlor, x5 5 (2) the delegation of broad managerial authority to
the trustee over entrusted property, 5 6 and (3) the imposition of limitations on the trustee's authority through the instrument that created
the trust.5 7
We see analogous features in the context of the legislator-citizen
relationship. First, just as the trustee-beneficiary relationship is established through an act of consent, the legislator-citizen relationship
arises from an act of consent by the electorate. Conventional democratic theory posits that the legitimacy of our republic is based on the
consent of the governed. 58 Of course, as Ethan Leib and his colleagues have argued, the "citizenry of even the most liberal and democratic of states rarely consent meaningfully to the state's authority.
Simply casting a ballot-or not voting-with-one's-feet-through-emigration-is hardly a conferral of consent to those individuals or institutions ruling over citizens' daily lives."** While consent in the
electoral context may not be as robust as a settlor's consent in the
private trust context, both sets of relationships (legislator-citizen and
trustee-beneficiary) can nonetheless be characterized as involving a
152

Nagy, Congressional Oficials supra note 10, at 1147.
Cf Deborah A. DeMott, Agency by Analogy: A Comment on Odious Debt, 70 L. & CoN
TrE. PRoBs. 157, 166-67 (2007) (comparing government officers to private trustees in the
odious debt context).
154
See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) Or TRusrs § 2 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs
Theory of Trust Loa, 89 CoRNELmL REv. 621, 624 (2004); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei,
The Functionsof Trust Law: A Comparative LAgal andEconomic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434,
438 (1998).
155
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF TRusTs § 13 (2003) ("A trust is created only if the settlor
properly manifests an intention to create a trust relationship.").
156 Id. § 2.
157
Cf id. (defining a trust as arising from the parties' intentions with respect to certain
property).
158 See Leib et al., Fiduciary Theory ofJudging, supranote 15, at 14.
153

159
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voluntary expression of willingness by a person or group of persons to
entrust responsibility to another person.xoo
Second, just as the private trustee is delegated broad authority to
manage the trust assets to benefit the beneficiaries, legislators have
been delegated broad legislative authority over the assets of their government, including the public fisc, to benefit citizens. At the federal
level, this delegation is signified by the first provision of the Constitution, Article I, Section 1, which established the U.S. Congress and refers to the "legislative Powers herein granted."' 6 '
Third, just as the deed of trust defines the constraints of a trustee's authority, the federal or state constitutions define the constraints
of legislative authority, either directly through express substantive provisions or indirectly by setting up procedures and institutions empowered to establish them. Of course, these constraints on the fiduciary
are not all encompassing. Although the purpose of the deed of trust
is to protect the interests of the beneficiaries in accordance with the
settlor's intention, the beneficiaries actually remain quite vulnerable
to a trustee's predation. Unlike in principal-agent relationships where
the principal can ordinarily intervene freely and dismiss agents at will,
the trust beneficiaries ordinarily must request judicial intervention in
order to dismiss a trustee for malfeasance.162 Similarly, citizens have
limited means of redress against legislators and exercise no meaningful control over them.
If this analogy to the trustee strikes one as odd, consider that a
growing body of scholarship recognizes not only that the Framers intended to impose fiduciary standards on government officials,' 63 in160 In the alternative, one could refer to the theory of popular sovereignty to argue
that the consent of "the people" of the thirteen revolutionary states, as expressed through
popular ratification in accordance with Article VII of the Constitution, constitutes the relevant consent on which the federal legislator-citizen relationship rests. For discussions of
the relationship between popular sovereignty and the legitimacy of our republic, see, for
example, LARy D. KRAMER, THE PEoPLE THEMsELvEs: PoPuLAR CONslTUTIONALISM AND
JuOaLe
REviEw 5 (2004); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions ofAmerican Constitutionalism:
PopularSovereignty and the Erly American ConstitutionalDebate 24 HAsINcs CoNsT. LQ. 287,
306-08 (1997); James A. Gardner, Consent, Lgtimacy and Elections: Implanenting Popular
Sovereignty Under the Lckean Constitution, 52 U . Prrr. L. REv. 189, 192 (1990); Sung Hui
Kim, "We the (Supermajority of) the People": The Development of a Rationalefor Written HigherLaw
in North American Constitutions, 137 PRoc. Am. PmL. Socv 364, 388-89 (1993).
161

U.S. CONsT. art. 1,

§

1.

162 Leib et. al, iduciasy Theory ofJudging, supra note 15, at 9.
163 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General
Wefare Clause and the FiduciaryLaw of the Founder, 11 TEx. REv. L. & Pot. 239, 244 (2007)
("[Tihe 'general Welfare' limitation [in the Taxing and Spending Clause] was one of a
number of provisions inserted to impose fiduciary-style rules on the new federal government.. . ."); Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Originsof the Necessary andProperClause,55
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 243, 248 (2004) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause was
intended to incorporate "the limitations of fiduciary duty"); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 Bure. L. REv. 1077, 1087 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, The
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164

cluding legislators,
but also that the fiduciary concept most
commonly invoked during the revolutionary era was trusteeship and
"public trust."1es For example, the Federalist Papers repeatedly characterizes public officials, including legislators, as trustees, 6 and the
U.S. Constitution refers to "public Trust" 6 7 and describes public offices as being of "Trust."168 In invoking the analogy to the trustee, the
Framers were merely continuing a tradition dating back to Cicero,
who famously opined that "[t]he guardianship of the state is a kind of
trusteeship." 69 Most of the English colonies were expressly founded
on the basis of trust-that the King had granted a charter for the benefit of the settlers residing in the colonies.o7 0
Moreover, these references to public trust were not just empty
metaphor. Recent legal-historical work supports the view that the
Framers intended even noncriminal breaches of trust by public offiConstitution and the Public Trust] ("[I]t really was the 'general purpose' of the founders to
impose fiduciary standards on the federal government."); Robert G. Natelson, The General
Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding,52 U. KAN. L. RErv. 1,
50 (2003) ("Public officials were seen as the people's agents and trustees, and bound by
something akin to private trust standards."); E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public
Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachmentfor High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies
a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1026 (1975).
An impressive and growing body of scholarship calls for imposing fiduciary standards
on government. See, e.g., EvaN Fox-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY'S PROMISE: THE STATE AS Fiouci
ARY4 (2011) (the state itself as a fiduciary); Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in
Covernment Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theoy, 1996 U. It.. L. REv. 57, 63 (1996) (congressmen need stricter fiduciary duties); EvanJ. Criddle, FiduciaryAdministration:Rethinking
PopularRepresentation in Agenry Rulemaking, 88 TEx. L. REv. 441, 448 (2010) (administrative
agencies as fiduciaries); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31
QuEN's L.J. 259, 260-61 (2005) (same as Fox-DEcENT, supra); Ethan J. Leib & David L.
Ponet, Fiduciary Repreentation and Deliberative Engagement with Children, 20 J. PouT. PHIL.
178, 179 (2012) [hereinafter, Leib & Ponet, Fiduciary Representation] (discussing recent
work on government actors as fiduciaries); D. Theodore Rave, Politiciansas Fiduciaries, 126
HARv. L. REv. 671, 677 (2013) ("political representatives" as fiduciaries).
164 See Leib et al., Fiduciary Theory offudging, supra note 15, at 17 (observing that John
Locke, "whose writings heavily influenced the U.S. founders," viewed legislators as fiduciary
trustees); supra note 163.
165 Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 163, at 1086-87.
166 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of
the people . . . ."); id. at 316 ("The nature of [legislators'] public trust implies a personal
influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people."); id. at 344 ("solemn trust"); id, at 350
(describing elected officials as holding the people's "public trust"); THE FEDERAIusr No.
59, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton) ("guardianship" and "trust"); id. at 396 (describing impeachable offenses as "those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men,
or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust").
167 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
18 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, ci. 7; id. art I, § 9, cl. 8; id, art. II, § 1, c. 2.
169 MAacus Ttuus CIERo, ON MoRAL OBLIGATION 69 (John Higginbotham trans.,
University of California Press 1967).
170 See Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 163, at 1134-36.
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Also, the tracials to be remediable by impeachment and removal.
dition of analogizing public officials to trustees continues on in
modem judicial opinions. For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in a case affirming the conviction of a public official
under the federal mail fraud statute: "[A] public official acts as 'trustee for the citizens and the State ... and thus owes the normal fiduciary duties of a trustee, e.g., honesty and loyalty' to the citizens and the
State." 7 2 Even the Senate's Standing Orders employ the trustee analogy to define senators' duties:
The ideal concept of public office, expressed by the words, 'A public office is a public trust', signifies that the officer has been entrusted with public power by the people; that the officer holds this
power in trust to be used only for their benefit and never for the
benefit of himself or of a few . . . .173
In short, in deciding whether legislators are fiduciaries, judges
can find a plausible analogy to the private trust. Just as trustees owe
fiduciary duties to beneficiaries, legislators owe fiduciary duties to citizens, some of whom will be counterparties to their trades.
2.

Analogy: Director (to Shareholders)

Besides the analogy to the private trust, might there be an analogy to the corporation? It is axiomatic that directors of a corporation
74
are fiduciaries of its shareholders under federal insider trading law,'
75
even though directors are neither trustees' nor agents of the corporation or its shareholders. 76 Might we analogize the legislator to a
director and the citizens whom the legislator represents to the corporation's shareholders?'" For purposes of this analogy, I focus on paradigmatic public corporations held by numerous and dispersed
shareholders.
171

See id. at 1170-71; Leib et. al, Fiduciaty Theoy ofJudging, supra note 15, at 17-18.
United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1294 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting in part United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (4th Cir. 1979)), reol, McNally v. United States,
superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); see infra Part IL.B.S.
173 Standing Orders of the Senate Manual, 87 S. Doc. 107-1, at 118-19 (2002).
17 See, e.g., SEC v. Blackwell, 291 F. Supp. 2d 673, 687 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (noting that a
director may be liable for insider trading violations for breaching the fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders); SEC v. Lenfest, 949 F. Supp. 341, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(noting that a director has a fiduciary duty to shareholders).
175 See RESTATEMENT (TUiRD) OF TItUSTs § 5(g) cmt. g (2003) ("Corporate... directors
. do not hold tide to the property of the corporation and therefore are not
172

trustees. . . .").

176 See RESrATEMENT (TsnRD) oF Aoeric § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006) ("[Corporate] directors are neither the shareholders' nor the corporation's agents. . . .").
177 Cf LANoEvooRT, supra note 42, § 6:6, at 6-21 n.5 ("An intriguing question is
whether elected officials can properly be treated as fiduciaries. Certainly, they are not
employees; there is no identifiable principal to whom they are responsible.... In this
sense, the analogy to a corporation's board of directors is apt.").
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An important feature of a widely held public corporation is the
separation of ownership from control. 7 8 Shareholders are traditionally regarded as owners of the corporation, and they do possess a
residual claim on the corporation's assets and earnings. 79 But, unlike
other common forms of ownership, shareholders do not exercise any
meaningful control over how corporate assets are managed. The law
in most states severely restricts shareholder power and accords broad
discretion over corporate affairs to a collective decision-making body
of specialists-the board of directors, which either alone or through
its delegatees makes the vast majority of corporate decisions.180 While
directors are charged with exercising their authority in the best interests of shareholders,1si shareholders have limited means of holding
directors accountable. Shareholders ordinarily cannot compel directors to undertake corporate actions or even to terminate underperforming directors. They can cast a ballot at director elections,
but in most cases this will be ineffective. Shareholders have no direct
access to corporate information, relying almost entirely on mandatory
disclosures filed with the SEC. Shareholders are diffuse, dispersed,
and face collective action problems in monitoring director actions. As
a result, many shareholders are rationally ignorant about corporate
affairs. 8 2
Our government also features separation of ownership from control. As Richard Painter has observed, "[a] republican form of govern178 See ADous A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PRoPERTY 5-6 (1933). For an illuminating examination of Berle and Means's contribution, see generally William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Cgnturys
Turn, 26 J. CoRn. L. 737, 754-56 (2001) (noting that Berle and Means were influential in
that they "hit the issue" of separation in entrepreneurial functioning).
179 SeeWilliam W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against SharehokierEmpowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 662-65 (2010) (discussing the shareholders' traditional role
and critiques of that role).
180 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(a) (2011) (stating that the corporation's business and affairs are "managed by or under the direction of a board of directors"). As the
leading state of incorporation for large corporations, Delaware's law on this issue is the
most important.

181 I do not revisit the age-old debate over the proper purpose of the corporation
because resolution of that debate is not critical to the purposes of this Article. For simplicitv, this Article assumes the conventional, shareholdervalue view of corporate purpose.
For a recent exposition of this debate and a critique of the shareholder value model, see
generally LvN STouT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PurrnNG SHAREHoLDERs FIRST
HAnus INVESTORS, CoRPoRATIoNs, AND THE Punuc (2012). For my take on the law of corpo-

rate purposes as applied to corporate diversity, see Sung Hui Kim, The DiversityDouble Standard, 89 N.C. L. REv. 945, 977-88 (2011).
182 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 395, 420 (1983) ("[T]here is no reason why shareholders ... should have any interest or expertise in managing the firm's affairs. Because of the easy availability of the exit
option through the stock market, the rational strategy for dissatisfied shareholders in most

cases, given the collective action problem, is to disinvest rather than incur costs in attempting to bring about change through the voting process.").
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ment departs from direct democracy by separating citizen ownership
of government from the politician's control of the process of governing."8 3 Similar to directors, legislators are, in essence, a collective
decision-making body of law-making specialists who have been accorded broad discretion to use government power and assets. Although legislators are charged with exercising their authority in the
best interests of citizens, citizens (like shareholders) have limited
means of holding their representatives accountable. Citizens cannot
compel their representatives to adhere to their platforms and cannot
revoke their cast votes. 18 Their primary means of residual control is
to vote their representatives out of office in periodic elections. Like
shareholders, citizens are also diffuse, dispersed, and face collective
action problems in monitoring their representatives. They can only
judge the performance of their representatives at a distance and only
with the imperfect assistance of the media. As a result, many choose
to remain rationally ignorant about their representatives'
performance.xas
In sum, directors are to shareholders as legislators are to citizens.
If there is a fiduciary relationship recognized in the former, it is reasonable to recognize a fiduciary relationship in the latter.
3.

Cases

Analogies to trustees or directors are nice, but if a judge wants to
recognize legislators as fiduciaries, he or she will feel more comfortable citing to cases, at least as persuasive authority. It is not difficult to
locate cases in which government officials, defined broadly, are rhetorically called public trustees or held to be entrusted with public responsibilities.1 s6 And there are many cases in which courts hold
government officials to be fiduciaries of citizens.' 8 7 Not surprisingly,
183
184
185

PAItTER, supranote 10, at 2.

See Leib & Ponet, Fiduciaty Representatiom supra note 163, at 187.
Cf Domi.o GREEN & IAN SHARmo, PA-rHoIES oF RAnoNAL CHOICE THEORY
94-95 (1994) (discussing the literature on the "rational ignorance hypothesis').
186 See, e.g., Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 450 (1874) ("The theory of our government is,
that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed with them are to be animated in
the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public
good."); Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 55 (1864) ("These offices are trusts,
held solely for the public good, and should be conferred from considerations of the ability,
integrity, fidelity, and fitness for the position of the appointee."); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d
694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("It is a living tenet of our society and not mere rhetoric that a
public office is a public trust.").
187
See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 942, 961 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming
mail and wire fraud convictions of state lottery director and noting that state officials owe a
"fiduciary duty .. . to the state and its citizens" (quoting United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d
778, 784 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982) (affirming mail fraud conviction and noting that the Alcoholic
Beverage Control commissioner breached a fiduciary duty "owed to the state and its citizens"))); United States v. Rebrook, 842 F. Supp. 891, 893-94 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (holding
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there are fewer cases in which the government officials at issue are
elected and held to owe fiduciary duties to citizens who elected them, as
required under classical theory. In those cases, courts have recognized a governor,ass mayors, 8 9 an elected county clerk,o90 elected
county officials,' 9 ' and state legislators' 92 as fiduciaries of citizens.
For example, in Driscoll v. Burlington-BristolBridge Co.,'" a unanimous Supreme Court of NewJersey announced that a cause of action
could lie against elected county officials for "abuse of discretion and
breach of trust" 94 in rubber-stamping a $12 million transaction
"under the influence of prominent persons seeking to further their
private interests." 95 Although the remedy granted did not depend on
a specific finding of a breach of duty, the court nevertheless
trumpeted the fiduciary obligations of both elected and appointed officials: "[Elected and appointed officials] stand in a fiduciary relationship to the people whom they have been elected or appointed to
serve. As fiduciaries and trustees of the public weal they are under an
96
inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity."
The basis for enforcing these obligations, according to the court,
rested on the sovereign power of the people of the State of New
Jersey:
These obligations are not mere theoretical concepts or idealistic abstractions of no practical force and effect; they are obligations imposed by the common law on public officers and assumed by them

as a matter of law upon their entering public office. The enforcethat attorney for West Virginia Lottery breached fiduciary duty owed to Lottery (a public
entity) and citizens of West Virginia by trading on material, nonpublic information relating
to contracts with third party vendors), revd, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995).
188 Soee.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that
the governor of Maryland owes fiduciary duties to Maryland citizens and the State of Maryland). After a series of vacations and rehearings, the Mandeldecision was superseded by 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
189 See, .g., Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 11 (N.J. 1955) (recognizing two mayors
and one deputy mayor as fiduciaries of the people whom they have been elected or appointed to serve).
19
See Cnty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Ill. App. C. 1975) (holding that
the county clerk, as "an elected public official," was the fiduciary of the people of Cook
County).
191 See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 221 (N.J. 1952) ("The
members of the board . .. are public officers holding positions of public trust. They stand
in a fiduciary relationship to the people whom they have been elected ... to serve.").
192
See Fuchs v. Bidwill, 334 N.E.2d 117, 119-20 (111.App. Ct. 1975) (discussing cases
treating state officials as trustees of the people), rev 1 on other grounds, 359 N.E.2d 158 (Ill.
1977).
1os 86 A.2d 201 (N.J. 1952).
194 Id. at 222-23. The court also noted that an official was not deserving 'of the trust
imposed upon him by the people of Burlington County when they elected him as a member of their board of chosen freeholders." Id. at 212.
195 Id. at 207.
196 Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
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ment of these obligations is essential to the soundness and efficiency of our government, which exists for the benefit of the people
who are its sovereign.197
Just as important, the court clarified that the governor, the attorney
general, and even private citizens all had standing to sue public officials
for breaching their obligations.xes
In Fuchs v. Bidwill, 99 the Illinois Appellate Court upheld a complaint alleging that Illinois state legislators violated their fiduciary duty
to use their public office solely in the best interest of the people of
Illinois and not for private gain.200 The plaintiffs alleged that state
legislators secretly profited from unique investment opportunities offered by a racetrack tycoon in an attempt to influence legislation relat01
ing to the licensing, regulating, and taxing of horse racing.2
The Court noted that "[ilt has long been agreed that public officials occupy positions of public trust" and that they "cannot use [their
office] directly or indirectly for personal profit."202 Moreover, "[t] hey
stand in a fiduciary relationship to the people [by] whom they have
been elected or appointed to serve." 203 Finally, the Court held that
private plaintiffs had standing to sue for their breach. 2 o It explained:
If the "public trust" doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all,
the members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust, must have the right and standing to enforce it.
To tell them that they must wait upon governmental action is often
effectual denial of the right for all time. 205
On appeal, in a deeply divided four-to-three decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed on the issue of private rights of action.206
However, the majority did not dispute the notion that state legislators
were fiduciaries of the citizens of Illinois. Indeed, notwithstanding
197

Id. at 222.
198 Id at 222 ("The citizen is not at the mercy of his servants holding positions of
public trust nor is he helpless to secure relief from their machinations except through the
medium of the ballot, the pressure of public opinion or criminal prosecution. He may
secure relief in the civil courts either through an action brought in his own name, or
through proceedings instituted on his behalf by the Governor ... or by the Attorney General ... ." (citations omritted)).

99 334 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
200 The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing the appellate court, quoted the complaint, which specifically mentions the fiduciary duty. SeeFuchs v. Bidwill, 359 N.E.2d 158,
160 (Ill. 1976).
201 Fuchs, 334 N.E.2d at 118-19.
202 Id. at 119.
203 Id. at 120 (quoting Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 11 (N.J. 1955)).
204 Id. at 122.
05 Id. (quoting Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970)).
206 Fuchs v. Bidwill, 359 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ill. 1976) ("[Tlhe public interest will not be
served in permitting persons, without limitation, to institute actions of this nature against
public officials when the Attorney General has declined to act.").
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the holding, the majority declared that the Attorney General was entitied to prosecute a breach of fiduciary duty action on behalf of the
State.207
To be sure, strictly speaking, it is not enough that the courts recognize elected officials as fiduciaries. After all, one's status as a fiduciary does not mean that one is a fiduciary for all purposes. 208 To create
a cognizable claim, courts must also find that such a relationship implies the requisite fiduciary duty under federal insider trading law.
Since Chiarella, courts have held that a defendant's failure to disclose
material, nonpublic information satisfies the necessary fraud element
of Rule 10b-5. 2so Thus, the requisite duty is the duty to disclose.
Once fiduciary status is found, imposing the duty to disclose in this
context should not be controversial because courts routinely and
widely place the duty to disclose on all fiduciaries. Judges can cite to
cases like United States v. Mandel, in which the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Governor of the State of Maryland breached his
fiduciary duty to disclose his financial interest in a legislative matter
and that such failure "defraud[ed] the public and pertinent public
bodies of their intangible right to honest, loyal, faithful and disinterested government" under the federal mail fraud statute. 210
As I have argued, judges can find legislators to be fiduciaries to
the citizens who elected them. Support can be found in suggestive
case law as well as two analogies: to private trustees and to corporate
directors. And this is precisely what is needed under the classical theory: the finding of a breach of fiduciary duty between defendant
trader (a legislator) and the counterparty of the trade (a citizen on
the other side of the trade).
C. Fiduciary to Legislature
Now let's switch beneficiaries from citizens to the legislature (and
fellow legislators). This switch in beneficiaries requires a switch in
theories of liability, away from classical to misappropriation. Under
the misappropriation theory, the fiduciary relationship runs not to the
trading counterparties but to the source of nonpublic information. If
207 Seeid. (noting the Attorney General's ability to prosecute state officials' ethics violations and to "seek an accounting or the imposition of a constructive trust").
208 Se, eg., Agasha Mugasha, Evolving Standards of Conduct (Fiducimy Duty, Good Faith
and Reasonableness) and Commercial Certainty in Multi-LenderContracts, 45 WAYNE L. REv, 1789,
1795-96 (2000) ("[In any particular analysis concerning the fiduciary principle, one has
to ascertain the subject matter over which fiduciary obligations extend. A fiduciary for
certain purposes need not be a fiduciary for all purposes; equally, a person who is generally
not a fiduciary can be a fiduciary for certain limited purposes." (footnote omitted)).
209 See suprasection 1.A.2.a.
210 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363-64 (4th Cir. 1979). For direct history
of this case, see supranote 172.
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a fiduciary relationship exists between the legislator and that source,
there is a strong basis for imposing the duty not to use confidential
information for personal gain.21
1.

Rule 10b5-2(b) Analysis

In 2000, in an attempt to clarify and perhaps to expand the scope
of the misappropriation theory, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2.
Subsection (b) established three nonexclusive categories of relationships that give rise to a fiduciary-like duty for purposes of the misappropriation theory. It provides that a duty of "trust or confidence"
exists where (1) there is an agreement to maintain confidentiality (2)
parties sharing material, nonpublic information have a "history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences" that leads to an actual or
reasonable expectation of nondisclosure; or (3) a person receives confidential information from a close family member (i.e., one's "spouse,
parent, child or sibling") unless the recipient shows that there was no
actual or reasonable expectation of nondisclosure. 212
It is not clear the SEC achieved the clarification that it sought
because not all courts have deferred to the SEC's rule. For example,
in SEC v. Cuban, a federal district court rejected Rule 10b5-2(b) (1) as
going beyond the scope of Section 10(b).213 Also, in United States v.
Kim, another federal district court raised questions about the validity
214
of Rule I 0b5-2(b) (2), although it did not directly rule on the issue.
But other courts have responded more positively. For example, in
SEC v. Yun, 21 5 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals approved in dicta
of both Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) and (2), although it signaled skepticism
about the reach of (3).216 Given this mixed judicial track record, Rule
10b5-2(b) should not be given talismanic significance in deciding
whether a fiduciary-like duty exists. That said, the rule provides some
guidance on factors possibly relevant to the fiduciary question.
211 There is no requirement that those owed a fiduciary obligation expressly proscribe
the exploitation of confidential information. LANGEVOORT, sape note 42, § 6:6, at 620.
212 SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b) (2011).
21s 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)
exceeds the SEC's statutory authority). On appeal, the judgment was vacated on other
grounds, with the Fifth Circuit clarifying that it was not reaching the validity of Rule 1Ob52(b)(1). SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 558 n.40 (5th Cir. 2010).
214 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014-15 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
215 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
216 Id. at 1273 n.23 (noting that "the SEC's new rule goes farther than we do in finding
a relationship of trust and confidence (e.g., the new rule creates a presumption of a relationship of trust and confidentiality in the case of close family members)" and finding that
prior case law did not go that far). It should be noted that the case was technically not
governed by Rule 10b5-2. See id at 1281-82 (vacating the district court'sjudgment on the
basis of a prejudicial error in the jury instructions).
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What, then, does a straightforward application of Rule 10b5-2(b)
say about legislators? Recall that SEC Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) emphasizes
the existence of an agreement of confidentiality. For Congress, one
can find such an agreement in the Code of Ethics for Government
Service,'2 1 7 which provides, inter alia, that "[a]ny person in Government Service should ... [n] ever use any information coming to him
confidentially in the performance of governmental duties as a means
for making private profit."2 1 8 For state legislators, similar obligations
may appear in state government ethics codes.
That said, basing a relationship of trust and confidence on a
mere confidentiality agreement remains deeply controversial219 and
thus may be the least likely of Rule 10b5-2(b)'s three categories to
survive further judicial scrutiny. As various commentators have noted,
an agreement to maintain the information's confidentiality is simply
not the same as a duty not to use such information for personal
gain,22 0 which is the relevant duty under misappropriation theory.
Moreover, nondisclosure agreements are often concluded by parties
that are negotiating at arms' length and clearly are not in any relation
of trust and confidence. 221 Such concerns explain the district court's
holding in SEC v. Cuban.2 2 2
However, legislators are not merely bound by an agreement of confidentiality. Indeed, it seems highly probable that they have an actual
or reasonable expectation of nondisclosure arising out of a history or
pattern of sharing confidences, in accordance with Rule 10b5-2(b) (2).
How do we know whether such an expectation exists? Aside from in217 CODE OF Emics FOR GovERNENwr SERvIcE, 72 Stat. B12 (1958), H. Cong. Res. 175,
85th Cong., 104 Cong. Rec. 13556-57 (1958) [hereinafter CODE OF Emics]. The Code of
Ethics, which applies to "all Government employees, including officeholders,' id at B12,
has been incorporated into the House Ethics Manual. H. CoMs. ON STmNDADS or Oe
cGAL CONDUcT, 110th Cong., HOUSE Enrses MANuAL 20, 355 (2008) [hereinafter HousE
Ermics MANUAL], http://ethics.house.gov/Media/PDF/2008 House-Ethics Manual.pdf.
The Senate Ethics Manual lists the Code of Ethics as a source ofjurisdiction for the Senate
Ethics Committee. S. SELtCT COMM'N ON ETucs, 108th Cong., SENATE ETmics MANuAL 7-8
(2003), availableat http://ethics.senate.gov/downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf.
218 CODE OF ETmics supra note 217, at B12, 1 8; see George, supa note 9, at 167 (recounting the reprimand (based on Code of Ethics paragraph 8) of Representative Robert
Sikes "on charges including the purchase of stock in the privately-held First Navy Bank,
whose establishment he was also actively promoting at a Naval Air Station").
219 For example, some commentators have argued that congressional ethics rules prescribing confidentiality are distinguishable from ethics rules commonly found in employee
policy manuals. See Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 9, at 296. The implication is
that congressional ethics rules may not be enforceable contractual provisions.
220 See, e.g., Nagy, Gradual Demise supranote 42, at 1362.
221
Jd
222 SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 724, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that
misappropriation theory required that the trader agree both to keep the information confidential andto not use the information for personal gain). On Cuban, see supra note 213
and accompanying text.
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223

formal, anecdotal evidence,
written internal procedures suggest
that legislators observe a norm of confidentiality at least with respect
to certain sensitive information.
For example, for Congress, the Senate's Standing Rules strongly
suggest a pattern of sharing confidences and an internally enforceable
norm of confidentiality. Rule 29.5 provides:
Any Senator, officer or employee of the Senate who shall disclose
the secret or confidential business or proceedings of the Senate,
including the business and proceedings of the committees, subcommittees[,j and offices of the Senate shall be liable, if a Senator, to
suffer expulsion from the body, and if an officer or employee, to
dismissal from the service of the Senate, and to punishment for
contempt.224
When the Senate was debating the 1992 Amendment to Rule
29.5, one senator referred to norms of both trust and confidentiality
among senators:
[C]andid discussions among Members depend upon a trust that is
based, in part, on a willingness of all Members to abide by the practices of the Senate.... The unilateral decision by a Member or
employee to release confidential committee information is inconsistent with the Senate's practice of making such decisions openly and
collectively. Arrogation of this responsibility by individuals can destroy mutual trust among Members and be harmful to this
institution.225
The Standing Rules also provide that committee proceedings may
be closed to the public if the matters to be discussed fall under one of
several listed categories where the need for preserving confidentiality
is great.226 One of those enumerated categories covers trade secrets
and other highly confidential financial information,227 suggesting that
223 See Barbabefla et al., supra note 10, at 221-22 (reporting evidence that "legislators
may feel that trading on information obtained through their positions is inappropriate,
even if they do not believe it is illegal").
224 STANDING RuLts OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-15, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Rule
XXIX, cl 5 (2000) [hereinafter SmarEt STANDING Ruas]; see George, supra note 9, at
167-68 (interpreting this Rule).
225 138 CoNG. REc. S17835, S17836 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). This testimony is also recounted in George, supranote 9, at 168-69.
226 The categories include "matters necessary to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States,"
SENATE STANDING RULES, Rule XXVI, cl. 5(b)(1) (2000), matters which "will represent a
clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual," idA at cl. 5(b)(3), matters
which "will disclose the identity of any informer or law enforcement agent or will disclose
any information relating to the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense that is
required to be kept secret in the interests of effective law enforcement," id at cl. 5(b) (4),
and "matters required to be kept confidential under other provisions of law or Government regulations," id at cl. 5(b) (6).
227 Idatcl.5(b)(5).
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senators do have ready access to inside information and not just market information.
Turning to the House of Representatives, various House rules
suggest that representatives observe a norm of confidentiality with respect to certain communications. 228 Although official committee and
subcommittee meetings "for the transaction of business" are generally
open to the public,m other communications may remain hidden
from public view. These other communications are governed by Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Procedure,m9 which provides that
"it is entirely within rule and usage for a committee to conduct its
proceedings in secret, and the House itself may not abrogate the secrecy of a committee's proceedings except by suspending the rule"
2 1
governing secrecy. s
Also, the House has an internal set of guidelines on what information is confidential. 232 According to these guidelines, confidential
information includes: information, the "inappropriate disclosure of"
which would "adversely reflect on the credibility of the House or office"; information relating to "specific legislative action taken or considered by the office"; information "provided to the House in
confidence or with restrictions on its use (i.e., trade secrets, commercial or financial information) from an individual, private entity, or
state or federal entity"; and "intra-[H]ouse" communications. 2 33
The above evidence suggests that federal legislators observe a
norm of secrecy with respect to certain information, including financial or commercial information, obtained on a confidential basis.
State legislative procedures might also provide evidence of confidentiality norms among state legislators. To the extent that a court agrees
228 See, e.g., RuLEs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 108-241, 108th
Cong. 2d Sess., Rule XVII, cl. 9 (2005) ("[When the Speaker or a Member .. . informs the
House that he has communications that he believes ought to be kept secret for the present,
the House shall be cleared of all persons except the Members ... for the reading of such
communications, and debates and proceedings thereon , , . .").
229 Id. at Rule XI, cl. 2(g)(1) (open meetings and hearings). Closed door meetings
are allowed for meetings of the Committee on Ethics or its subcommittees and where disclosure of information would, among other things, (i) "endanger national security," (ii)
"compromise sensitive law enforcement information," or (iii) "violate a law or rule of the
House." Id.
230 THomAsJEFFERSON, A MANuAL oF PARuAmENTARY PRAcrICE (1801), eprinted in H.R.
Doc. No. 107-284, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
hrm/browse_108.hunl [hereinafter JEFHERsoN, MANUAL4 see also Orrin G. Hatch, judicial
Nomination FilibusterCause and Cume 2005 UTAm L. REv. 803, 827-28 n.128 (2005) (noting
that the Manual still governs the House today).
231 JEFFERSON, MANUAL, supranote 230, at sec. XI (annotation) (citation omitted).
232 SeeUNrro STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES I.FORMnON SECURlY PUBUCATION,
GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING INFORMATION SENSITIrry, available at http://web.archive.

org/web/20061215031815/http:/www.house.gov/cao-opp/PDFSolicitations/HISPUB008.
pdf [hereinafter House Information Sensitivity Guidelines].
233 George supra note 9, at 169 (quoting House Information Sensitivity Guidelines).
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with the SEC about the relevance of the factors listed in Rule lOb52(b)(1) and (2), those factors cut in favor of finding a duty of trust
and confidence between legislators and fellow legislators on the one
hand, and between legislators and the legislature on the other.
2.

Analogy: Partner

Regardless of Rule 10b5-2(b), a court could recognize legislators
as fiduciaries by analogizing to the relationships among fellow partners to one another and to the partnership itself. Of course, there are
different types of partnerships with different attributes to be compared. For purposes of this analogy, I am concerned only with the
oldest form of partnership-the general partnership. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), which thirty-seven states have
adopted, 234 partners are both agents and principals of the partnership
and thereby owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to one another
and to the partnership itself, whether or not they are acting as managers or agents. 2 3 5
Accordingly, in SEC v. Peters,"* a federal district court found that
a partner potentially violated federal insider trading laws under the
misappropriation theory by trading on confidential information entrusted to him by his partner.2 7 And in O'Hagan,the federal insider
trading case in which the Supreme Court affirmed the misappropriation theory itself, the Court held that the defendant, a partner of the
law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, breached his fiduciary duty owed to the
partnership.238 The fiduciary nature of the partner-partner/partnerpartnership relationship is so well established that courts often refer
to it as the touchstone of comparison in resolving novel cases. For
example, in an insider trading case, SEC v. Sargent, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals declared that the two sole shareholders of a closely
held corporation were fiduciaries of each other because their mutual
duties "mirror [ed] those owed between partners in a partnership."239
234 PartnershipAct, UNroan LAw CommsioN, available at http://www.uniforniaws.
org/Act.aspx?tide=Partnership+Act (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (showing a map of states
that have adopted RUPA).
235
See RUPA § 404(a) (2006). But cf Larry E. Ribstein, Are PartnersFiducianes?, 2005
U. It. L. REv. 209, 251 (2005) (arguing that partners should be subject to fiduciary duties
"only as agents or as managers of centrally managed firms").
236 735 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Kan. 1990).
237 Id. at 1521 (finding enough evidence of a violation to withstand summary judgment, although relevant information did not relate to the partnership business but to a
side business of the partner who confided information); see SEC v. Michel, 521 F. Supp. 2d
795, 826 (N.D. III. 2007) (finding that a partner-partner relationship constituted the relevant relationship of trust and confidence under misappropriation theory).
238 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 & n.7 (1997).
239 SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68,76 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975)).
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What are the important partnership characteristics? Under
RUPA, a partnership is an "association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit . .. whether or not the persons
intend to form a partnership." 240 In most jurisdictions, co-ownership
requires a mutual undertaking of the parties to share in the profits
and control of the business.24 ' In some jurisdictions, the parties must
also agree to share losses. 242
Can we analogize the legislature to a partnership? Let us take
Congress as the example, although the analysis is similar for state legislatures. At first glance, we notice that Congress is not (at least not
ostensibly) a profit-making enterprise, so the requirement that partners agree to share in the profits or losses of the business seems not to
be met. But if we look beyond the technical expression of the rule, we
see that the broader purpose of an agreement to share profits or
losses is for the parties to link their economic fates (and thus their
future livelihoods) with the fate of the enterprise as a whole and to
one another. If we relax the profit-making assumption, we see that
members of Congress, too, have undertaken a common venture-that
of legislating for our nation. Members have left their districts and
voluntarily tied their careers to those of other members and that of
Congress as a whole. Legislation that is passed by both chambers of
Congress and not vetoed by the President is binding on individual
members, Congress itself, and the federal government. Also, the general reputation of Congress will impact the fate of the individual legislator come reelection. In this sense, the fates of members are linked
together in the common enterprise of lawmaking.
Further, members of Congress share in the control of the legislature just as partners share in the control of the business. As a result,
in both cases, a division of labor necessarily arises, as no single member or partner can perform all the tasks required of their common
undertaking. For partnerships, some partners will contribute the capital while others contribute their labor. The default rule for partnerships, however, is that they all vote on partnership matters.245
240
241

RUPA § 202(a).
For an example of the traditional approach, see Ziegler v. Dahl, 691 N.W.2d 271,

275-77 (N.D. 2005); DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENoy, PARTNERSHIPS, ANo LLCs: EXAMPLES

ANDEXPLANATIONs 220-21 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the "key characteristics" of a partnership in most jurisdictions).
242 See e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (requiring a showing of "the parties' sharing of profits and losses"); Ingram v. Deere,
288 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tex. 2009) (requiring an agreement to share losses); Gates v. Houston, 897 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (requiring a voluntary contract of association for
the purpose of sharing "profits and losses").
245 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Paitnership24 (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. LEO64025, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=940653 (summarizing the default rules).
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Similarly, for Congress, members are assigned to and spend much of
their time deliberating in various congressional committees or subcommittees. 244 But all members participate in floor debates and vote
on legislation.
None of the above is to say that members of Congress are as a
factual matter cordial and collegial to one another. Just as a partnership can be discordant and dysfunctional, Congress can be and has
been discordant and dysfunctional. But harmony in fact has never
been a required element for imposing fiduciary duties. For example,
courts have imposed fiduciary duties on partners already in strained
relations245 and on couples on the brink of divorce.2 4 6 Indeed, a major purpose of fiduciary law is to protect against abuses arising in such
antagonistic contexts. Also, despite popular perceptions to the contrary, members of Congress are in a nontrivial sense engaged in ajoint
undertaking and must come together in order to discuss and pass legislation. Moreover, as the evidence of norms summoned in Part II.C.1
above suggests, members actually do cooperate with one another in
keeping certain information confidential.
Under the misappropriation theory, judges can classify legislators
as fiduciaries to fellow legislators and to the legislature itself. The
SEC's Rules 10b5-2(b) (1) and (2) provide some support. More importantly, for purposes of this Article, judges can draw an analogy to a
paradigm example of a fiduciary relationship: fellow partners and the
partnership. 247
D.

Fiduciary to Government

Let's switch beneficiaries one final time. Under the misappropriation theory, are legislators fiduciaries to the government they serve?
1.

Analogy: Director(to Corporation)

Recall that I've already analogized legislators to directors for purposes of the classical theory. In that discussion, I argued that just as
244 For example, in trial testimony, Congressman Barney Frank once testified that
"members of the House of Representatives tend to specialize and often trust the judgment
of colleagues about the contents of noncontroversial bills" and that "a typical Representative might know the contents of less than ten percent of the bills considered by the House."
United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1992).
245 See,e.g.,Johnson v. Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938).
246 Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 364 P.2d 247, 252 (Cal. 1961) ("[B]ut
the husband's fiduciary duties in respect to his wife's interest in the community property
continue as long as his control of that property continues, notwithstanding the complete
absence of confidence and trust, and the consequent termination of the confidential
relationship.").
247 Even if one rejects this line of argument as being too facile, the analogy to partners
serves as an important reminder that oft-cited factors-such as "superiority" and "domination"-are not essential to all fiduciary relationships.
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directors are fiduciaries to their shareholders, legislators can be seen
as fiduciaries to the citizenry. Here, under the misappropriation theory, I argue that legislators are fiduciaries to the government they
serve, from which they receive material, nonpublic information. The
corporate analogy is that directors are fiduciaries to the corporation.
Accordingly, in SEC v. Talhot 24 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a director could violate federal insider trading laws under
the misappropriation theory by trading on confidential information
relating to another company in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the
corporation, which was the "immediate source and rightful owner of
the information."249
Because it is well established that directors have a fiduciary obligation to the corporation, the task here is to explain why we should
compare legislators with directors. Under the theory of director primacy,250 directors reign supreme over corporate actions. To be sure,
on a daily basis, officers make the operational decisions. But, as a
formal legal matter, directors have the ultimate power to make decisions on behalf of the corporation. Legislators arguably stand in a
similar position vis-A-vis the government they serve. Especially relevant is the fact that legislatures tend to have broad jurisdiction to legislate in the public interest. 251 Moreover, they typically enjoy the power
252
of the purse and control the funding of government projects.
The strongest objection comes from the fact that both federal
and state governments separate powers among three coequal
branches of government-not only the legislative but also the judicial
and executive. To take Congress as an example, it is hard to say that
Congress reigns supreme over the actions of the federal government
when the judiciary can strike down statutes as unconstitutional. Also,
the executive branch in various domains enjoys de jure and de facto
power that rivals Congress's.
That said, it is difficult to suggest that judges and executive officials are more like directors than legislators are. Judges, even the
judges of the highest court, do not fit the mold. Their power is too
sharply delimited in terms ofjurisdiction, while their decision-making
process is too narrowly cabined by precedent and stare decisis. The
President and high-level executive branch officials also behave more
248 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008).
249 Id. at 1094.
250 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Psimacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governane, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 550-51 (2003) (describing the director-primacy model).
251 Congress has wide-ranging authority under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CoNsT. art.
I, § 8. State legislatures generally enjoy a wide-ranging police power to legislate in the
public interest. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. X.
252 Congress's power here stems from the Taxing and Spending Clause, U.S. CONsr.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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like corporate officers than directors. On the other hand, executive
branch officials often do not and need not answer to Congress in the
way that a corporate officer must (at least formally) answer to the
board. In the end, I can defend only a weaker position-that no
other body (including the other two coequal branches of government) stands in a clearly superiorposition to the legislature with respect to its claim to "direct" the nation or the state. If judges are
persuaded, then they can analogize a legislator's duty to the government to a director's duty to the corporation.253
2.

Cases

In addition to this analogy, there are some relevant precedents.
Myriad opinions find public officials to be fiduciaries of their federal,
state, or municipal government, or, in some cases, the government
agency that employed them. For example, at the federal level, courts
have imposed fiduciary obligations on an army engineer,254 an employee of the Department of Agriculture,25 5 a foreign service officer,256 a civilian employee of the United States Engineers,25 7 a real
estate appraiser for the Federal Housing Administration,258 a president and vice president of Export-Import Bank of the United
States,259 a CIA agent,2 o and an Interior Secretary.261 At the state and
local level, courts have imposed fiduciary obligations on an attorney
and director of the state lottery,262 a state alcoholic beverage commis25$ One can also argue that members are fiduciaries to the government by virtue of
being employees of their government. Nagy makes just this argument, although she concedes that members of Congress are not quite like the employees working on their staffs, a
point with which I agree. SeeNagy, Congressional Officials, supra note 10, at 1156-57. I
would add that there are many other reasons to think that legislators are not mere employees and, in fact, look much more like employers. As I have already argued, there is more
than a passing resemblance between legislators and corporate directors, and directors are
not generally treated as employees, for example under Title VII. See,e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450-51 (2003) (holding that physicians
who were both directors and shareholders of a corporation should not be counted as employees). More generally, "[d]irectors are traditionally employer rather than employee
positions." Chavero v. Local 241, Div. of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 787 F.2d 1154,
1157 (7th Cir. 1986).
254 United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305 (1910).
255 United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Va. 1969).
256 United States v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 167 (D.S.C. 1979).
257 United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1961).
258 United States v. Kenealy, 487 F. Supp. 1379, 1379 (D. Mass. 1980), afld 646 F.2d
699 (1st Cir. 1981).
259 United States v. Kearns, 595 F.2d 729, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
260 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980).
261 United States v. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 55 F.2d 753, 756, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1932).
262 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1995) (director of state lottery);
United States v. Rebrook, 842 F. Supp. 891, 893-94 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (attorney of state
lottery).
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a fire department chief,2 6* a
sioner,2** a state land commissioner,
2
city treasurer,'o a city press secretary and director of public relations,2 67 and a city attorney.268
Moreover, courts have not reserved the fiduciary status solely for
appointed officials. Elected officials, such as a mayor,269 a governor,2 7o and a city councilman, 27' have also been recognized as fiduciaries of their state or municipality.
If we focus on Congress, the case of United States v. PodelF72 which has never been cited in the scholarly commentary on insider
trading2 7a-provides clear authority for the proposition that members
of Congress are fiduciaries of the United States. In this case, Congressman Podell pled guilty to federal bribery charges under 18 U.S.C.
§ 203,274 after which the federal government filed a civil action to recover the improper payments he had received.275
In granting the government's summary judgment motion, the
federal district court carefully clarified that this civil action was not
grounded in Podell's criminal violation but rather was based on a
breach of fiduciary duty "as evidenced by [the criminal violation]"276
and "not on any federal statutory authority."277 The court declared
that Podell was a fiduciary of the US government and, interestingly,
did so by invoking an analogy to the master-servant relationship:
264

A public official stands in a fiduciary relationship with the United
States, through those by whom he is appointed or elected. If he
secretly advances interests adverse to those of the government which
he serves, it is a breach of confidence and he must account to his
263
264

265
266
267

United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 780, 784 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982).
Williams v. State ex ret Morrison, 315 P.2d 981, 981 (Ariz. 1957).
City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812, 813-14 (Minn. 1913).
City of Boston v. Dolan, 10 N.E.2d 275, 278, 281 (Mass. 1937).
United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 641, 643 (1975).
City of Hastings v. Jerry Spady Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 369, 369 (Neb.

268
1982).
269 City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 30 N.E.2d 278, 306 (Mass. 1940).
270 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1979); Agnew v. State,
446 A.2d 425, 440-41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
271
United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1975).
272 436 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
273 While not cited in the scholarly literature, this case was mentioned in congressional
testimony. See Stop Tradingon CongresionalKnowledgeAct: Hearingon H.R 1148 Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Jack Maskell, Legislative Att'y,
Cong. Research Serv.).
274 The statute prohibits members of Congress from accepting compensation for "any
representational services ... in relation to any. . . matter in which the United States is a
party." 18 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1) (2006).
275 See Podell 436 F. Supp. at 1040.
276 Id. at 1042.
277

&
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"master" for the benefits received as a result, irrespective of consideration of fraud or damage.278
In sum, under the misappropriation theory, judges can classify
legislators as fiduciaries of the government that they serve. Support
can be found in numerous judicial opinions recognizing public officials, including elected officials, as fiduciaries. As for members of
Congress, Podell provides direct precedent for classifying members as
fiduciaries of the US government. More importantly, judges can draw
an analogy to the fiduciary relationship between a director and the
corporation that he serves.
Now that I've marshaled support for finding legislators to be fiduciaries of their legislature, of fellow legislators, and of their government under the misappropriation theory, the task is to justify
imposing the specific duty not to use entrusted confidential information for personal gain, which is the relevant duty for the misappropriation theory and tipping cases. Unlike the fiduciary duty to disclose,
which is routinely applied to all fiduciaries, the scope of the duty not
to use entrusted information for personal gain may vary from one fiduciary context to another. While it is uncontroversial to proscribe
the exploitation of information that harms or injures the beneficiary,
it is slightly more controversial to proscribe the exploitation of information regardless of whether injury can be demonstrated.279 The
question about harms is relevant because whether insider trading
harms anyone has been the subject of intense scholarly debate. 280
That debate will not be settled here, although I have discussed the
harms of insider trading elsewhere. 28 ' For purposes of this Article,
suffice it to say that courts have regularly imposed duties on public
fiduciaries without requiring any showing of harm.282 Moreover,
278 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
279 That said, under federal insider trading law, a demonstration of potential injury
should be enough. LANGEVOORT, supranote 42, § 6:8, at 6-34.1. Also, the O'FaganCoures
lack of significant discussion about harms-apart from the harms to the integrity of the
securities markets--might be read to suggest that harmfulness of this type of breach of the
duty of loyalty is presumed. See id. § 6:8, at 6-34.1 to -35.
280 S e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The InsiderTradingProhibition:A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 35, 36-37 (1986) (sunmarizing the debate on whether the
insider trading prohibition has a "rational basis" at all); William KS. Wang, Trading on
MaterialNonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAuF. L. REv. 1217, 1225-29 (1981) (summarizing the
respective cases for and against regulating insider trading).
281 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
282 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305 (1910) ("It is immaterial . .. whether the complainant was able to show that it had suffered any actual loss
. .. ."); Cnty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 548 (Ill. App. 1975) ("The absence of an
allegation of damage is immaterial."); Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1955) ("It
would be a dangerous precedent to lay down as law that unless some affirmative fraud or
loss can be shown, the agent may hold on to any secret benefit ... out of his agency."
(quoting Carter, 217 U.S. at 306)); see also cases discussed infra Part iIC.
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courts have found liability based on the public fiduciary's use of entrusted information for personal gain, without requiring that harm be
demonstrated. 28 3

I have argued that the majority view-that judges could not recognize legislators as fiduciaries under federal insider trading law-is
wrong and continues to be wrong. Legislators can be deemed fiduciaries to citizens, the legislature (and fellow legislators), and the government that they serve. By analyzing congressional ethics rules, citing
relevant cases, and analogizing to trustees, partners, and directors,
courts could classify legislators as fiduciaries and impose the requisite
fiduciary duties under federal insider trading law. Courts could do so
regardless of and in addition to the STOCK Act. They could do so
through ordinary legal reasoning.
III
AGAINST CORRUPTION

A.

Deepening Analogies

Part II was mostly an extended exercise in analogical reasoning.
The question presented was whether legislators could be deemed "fiduciaries" under pre-STOCK Act federal insider trading law and how
this might be done. The way that I answered that question was to cite
relevant cases-such as Driscoll Fuchs, and Podell-and also to elaborate point-by-point analogies to private trustees, corporate directors,
and partners. This sort of analogical reasoning is what judges and
lawyers do every day. Its persuasiveness is often intuitive and aesthetic:
is there some flash of recognition between legislators and, say, corporate directors?
But the fact that analogies somehow "click" does not necessarily
mean that they are well reasoned. For example, Tamar Frankel has
criticized fiduciary law's reliance on analogies as "uninstructive, be283 See,eg., United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding that use
of governmental information by city councilman for personal gain amounts to a breach of
fiduciary duty which is actionable under mail fraud statute); United States v. Rebrook, 842
F. Supp. 891, 893-94 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (rejecting defendant's argument that loss must be
alleged in order to state a claim under the wire fraud statute and finding liability under
such statute for misuse of confidential information gained by virtue of one's position);
Williams v. State ex re Morrison, 315 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Ariz. 1957) (noting that the commissioner "used the information obtained from such examination for his personal profit"
and thus "did not truly and faithfully perform all of his official duties and consequendy
breached the conditions of his bond, and the surety is liable"); City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812, 814 (Minn. 1913) (holding that the fire department chief, as agent
of the city, must disgorge profits accrued from sale of land to the city when he purchased
such land based on information gleaned by virtue of his position, regardless ofwhether the
principal is or is not benefited thereby).
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cause the courts do not explain why some similarities . .. are relevant
and others not."284 In recent legal academic discussion, various
schools of thought have surfaced on the nature of analogical reasoning.28 5 I concur with Judge Richard Posner, who understands analogies as ultimately rhetorical acts that can be justified only by looking
to some underlying policy or purpose of the law that is to be applied
and extended.286 Accordingly, in order to provide a deeper justification for the analogies offered above, I need to unpack the underlying
policy or purpose that animates fiduciary law.
In this Part, my basic claim is that it is entirely appropriate and
consistent with the law of fiduciary obligation to recognize legislators
as fiduciaries and to impose on them the requisite duties. To support
this claim, I defend a plausible definition of (public) corruption as
the "use of public office for private gain," and I show how legislator
insider trading fits that definition. I then demonstrate that one core
purpose behind the common law of fiduciaries is to deter corruption.
Although prior commentary has casually observed some link between
fiduciary principles and preventing corruption, 8 7 this is the first systematic demonstration of that connection. To make this showing, I
explore one strand of cases in fiduciary law targeting corruption in
the public sector. These cases forbid the public fiduciaries in question from using their public positions for private gain. In the end, I
show an organic alignment between recognizing legislator insider
trading as a breach of fiduciary duty and one core purpose of the
common law of fiduciaries. This alignment provides a deeper justification for the analogies offered above.2*8
In discussing the purposes and policies undergirding fiduciary
law and in classifying legislator insider trading as a form of corrupFrankel, supranote 147, at 805.
285 See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force ofLegal Argument by Analogy, 109 HAnv. L REv. 923, 962-66 (1996) (discussing different forms of analogical reasoning); Richard A. Posner, Reasoningby Analogy, 91 CoRNELL L.
REv. 761, 761-65 (2006) (reviewing LLoYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REAsoN' THE UsE oF ANAL,
OGYAND LEGAL ARGuMENT (2005)) (concluding that reasoning by analogy is just a form of
judicial and lawyerly rhetoric rather than a substantive statement of law); Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning 106 HARv. L. REv. 741, 742 (1993) (defending analogical reasoning over various other methods of legal thought).
286 As Judge Posner puts it
There is no such thing as an "analogical argument" in any but a rhetorical
sense; you need reasons to determine whether one case should be thought
relevantly similar to another. Analogies are not reasons; reasons are what is
necessary to determine whether a similarity shall be treated as a ground for
action, an analogy guiding decision.
Posner, supra note 285, at 768.
287 See, e.g., FINN, supra note 133, at 214 (observing that fiduciary law's objection to
bribes and secret commissions "lies in their corrupting tendency").
288 Part III is severable from Part II. If the reader needs nothing more to be convinced
to find the fiduciary duty, the reader should skip to Part IV, where I address objections.
284
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tion, readers may jump to the conclusion that I am making some
global, untethered evaluation that legislator insider trading is bad and
thus should be banned. Although I believe this to be true and have
argued the point elsewhere,m89 that is not my task here. As noted in
the Introduction, my ultimate task is to ask whether judges, if confronted with a case of legislator insider trading, could find legislators
to be fiduciaries within the meaning of federal insider trading law using ordinary judicial reasoning. Above, I answered that question in
the affirmative. Below, I make an even stronger case by showing that
the analogies invoked did not trade on trivial, coincidental, or arbitrary similarities like the fact that zebras and barber poles both have
stripes. Instead, judges can justify the analogies on the ground that
extending the category of fiduciary to encompass legislators promotes
an underlying policy of fiduciary law, which is to combat
o
corruption.2 m
B.

Corruption

As Justice Potter Stewart said of obscenity, people seem to know
public corruption when they see it, but it is hard to define. 29 x One
source of difficulty lies in the fact that what counts as corruption is
historically contingent. For example, today it is uncontroversial to say
that a legislator accepting a bribe is corrupt. But in the nineteenth
century, members of Congress openly accepted payments from companies lobbying to obstruct or advance particular legislation. For in289 See Kim, Governmental Insider Trading supra note 34.
2oo Careful readers might object that I have lost track of what is really important, that
the relevant policy consideration is not of fiduciary law generally but of insider trading law,
which happens to bar such trading only when it breaches a fiduciary-like duty. But such an
objection implicitly assumes that insider trading law and fiduciary law have substantially
different goals. To the contrary, as I have argued below, one of the important goals of
fiduciary law is to stop corruption. And, as I argue in a companion piece, insider trading
law can best be theoretically rationalized as an attempt to stop one form of private corruption. See Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption (Mar. 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Accordingly, extending the fiduciary category to
include legislators in a manner consistent with a core purpose of fiduciary law (anti-corruption) will be consistent with the purpose of federal insider trading law (also anti-corruption). Finally, it is my view that when the Supreme Court in Chiarellaexpressly predicated
insider trading liability on a breach of fiduciary duty, it intended to incorporate the purposes of fiduciary law.
291 See, e.g., Michael A. Genovese, PraidentialComption:A LongitudinalAnalysis,in Cow
RurnoN AND AMERIcAN Pourncs 135, 136 (Michael A. Genovese & Victoria Farrar-Myers
eds., 2010) [hereinafter CORRUTION AND AmRCAN PounclS (l[T]here is no commonly
accepted definition of what constitutes corruption."); Michael Johnston, The DefinitionsDebate: Old Conflicts in New Guises, in THE PotrncAt EcONOMY OF CORRUPTION 11, 12 (Arvind
K. Jain ed., 2001) ("No one has ever devised a universally satisfying 'one-line definition' of
corruption."); Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perrptionsof Comption and CampaignFinance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Lao, 153 U. PA. L REv. 119, 126-27
(2004) (noting that corruption means different things to the different Supreme Court
Justices).
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stance, Daniel Webster was on retainer from the Bank of the United
States to represent the bank's interests, and he unabashedly sent written reminders to replenish his bank account. 292 Indeed, it was not
until 1853 that congressional bribery was formally banned.29 3 And
even after the ban, bribed members went undisciplined until public
outrage erupted over the Credit Mobilier bribery scandal in the 1870s,
which impelled Congress to begin censuring them.2 9 4 Not until more
than a century later, in 1980, did the House finally expel a member
for bribery.295
Also, what counts as corruption is culturally contingent. 29 Societies maintain different political systems with differing notions of accountability, cultivate different institutions of power with varying
degrees of maturity and legitimacy, negotiate different boundaries between public and private domains, and draw on diverse relationships
between power and wealth. Accordingly, societies necessarily experience corruption in diverse ways, making it difficult to define both precisely and universally. As John Kleinig and William C. Heffernan have
concluded: "Both historically and cross-culturally, instantiations of
corruption have been contested, not only with respect to their identity
but also, in certain instances, with respect to their undesirability."297
292 Daniel Webster, who served in the House and Senate and as Secretary of State,
once reminded the President of the Bank of the United States: "If it be wished that my
relation to the Bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual retainers."
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF NICHOLAS BIDDLE 218 (Reginald C. McGrane ed., 1919) (Webster
to Biddle, Dec. 21, 1833).
293 SeeDENNIS F. THOMPsON, ETmics IN CoNGREss: FROM INDIVIDUAL, TO INSTITUTIONAL
CoRRu'rroN 2 (1995).
294 See id.
295 The House voted unanimously to expel Michael J. "Ozzie" Myers, a Pennsylvania
Democrat who accepted bribes in an undercover ABSCAM investigation. This was the
House's first expulsion for corruption. Id. Four years earlier, the House failed to expel
AndrewJ. Hinshaw, a California Republican who had been convicted of accepting a bribe.
Id.
296 SeejENs CH. ANDvIG & ODD-HELGE FJELDsTAD wITH INGE AMUNosEN. TONE SISSENER
&TINA SOREIDE, CORRUPTION: A REVIEW oF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 46 (2001) ("[W]hat is
seen as corruption varies from one country to another."). That said, as Robert Klitgaard
notes, "[olver a wide range of 'corrupt' activities, there is little argument that they are
wrong and socially harmful," even across societies. ROBERT KLrTrAARD, CONTROLUNG CORRUPTION 4 (1988).
297 John Kleinig & William C. Heffernan, The Corruptibilityof Comption, in PRvATE AND
Puauc ContrrpoN 3, 3 (William C. Heffernan &John Kleinig eds., 2004). The authors
note:
Even if we confine ourselves to what we now familiarly speak of as public
corruption, it soon becomes clear that what "we" consider to be corrupt is
often contentiously so. One group's perquisite is another's corruption; one
group's tradition of patronage is another's nepotism; one group's campaign contribution is another's bribery; one group'sjust rectification is another's misappropriation.
Id.
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And even within a single society at a particular moment in time,
there will be disagreement about what counts as corruption. For example, elites differ from the general public in what they regard as
corrupt. 2 9 8 Also, factors such as race, education, and income affect
the likelihood of perceiving the government to be corrupt. 299
Given such contingencies and controversies, my goal is not to
proffer and defend some best definition of public corruption, which
would attempt to specify a strict set of necessary and sufficient conditions that capture all instances of what people regard as corruption
with no over- or under-inclusiveness. Indeed, the cognitive science of
categorization casts serious doubt on the success of any such project.o00 Instead, I offer something more modest: a definition that
draws on rough consensus in the political science and political economy literatures, incorporates less contested cultural understandings,
and performs useful analytic work in the narrow context of insider
trading.
I start with the "classical" understanding of public corruption in
political science. As Dennis Thompson explains:
In the tradition of political theory, corruption is a disease of the
body politic. like a virus invading the physical body, hostile forces
spread through the political body, enfeebling the spirit of the laws
and undermining the principles of the regime. The form the virus
takes depends on the form of govemment it attacks. In regimes of a
more popular cast, such as republics and democracies, the virus
shows itself as private interests. Its agents are greedy individuals,
contentious factions, and mass movements that seek to control collective authority for their own purposes. The essence of cormuption in

this conception is the pollution of the public by the private.s
298 See MatthewJ. Streb & April K. Clark, The Public and PoliticalCorrption,in ConaurTION AND AMERIcAN Pours, supranote 291, at 278, 281 (discussing the perception gap in
the views of the elites versus the public on corruption).
299 These factors, however, are less predictive than a respondent's political attitudes.
See Persily & Lammie, supranote 291, at 153-67.
300 Since the 1970s, advances in the fields of cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics,
artificial intelligence, and anthropology have provided a persuasive account of how
humans categorize people, things, and abstract concepts. Such an account discounts the
role of deductive reasoning from abstracted principles. See generally GEoRGE LAKOFF, WoMEN, FIRE, AND DANGERous THINGs: WHAT CATEGoREs REvEAL ABoUT THE MIND (1987)
(discussing the importance of categorization and describing the variety of ways in which
humans categorize). Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contsibutionsand Cormption: Comments on Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. Cu. LEGAL F. 163, 164 ("ClOncepts such as corruption
cannot be applied satisfactorily to political life by deduction from general theoretical propositions."). For a specific exploration of these insights onto the legal profession, see Sung
Hui Kim, LawyerExceptionatismin the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REv. 73, 95-111 (2010).
301 TaoursoN, supranote 293, at 28 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For explorations of alternative, more intuitive understandings of corruption, including those defini-

tions that emphasize the underlying psychological condition rather than the outward
behavior, see generally Kleinig & Heffernan, supranote 297; Laura S. Underkuffler, Cap-
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Thus, the classical understanding of public corruption is
groumded in the notion that private interests somehow taint the public good. More modern definitions of corruption build on this understanding but tend to drop the organic metaphors of disease,
degeneration, or decay.302 They also tend to replace substance with
procedure-the notion of substantive public good is replaced by the
democratic process, which purifies private interests into legitimate
public purposes.30 Under most modern definitions, corruption involves an abuse of trust occasioned by an improper commingling of
one's public role and private gain in derogation of predetermined
democratic processes-essentially, an act that disrespects the sacred
border between public and private. At minimum, there seems to be
an academic consensus that public corruption entails an "abuse of
public roles or resources for private benefit."304 In short, public corruption is the use of public office for private gain. 05 Reflecting this
tured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption in Law (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the author).
302 On the modem definitions of corruption, see THOMPSON, supra note 293, at 29.
303 SeTToursoN, supranote 293, at 28 (noting that the modern conception of corruption retains the notion of the "pollution of the public by the private" but replaces the
"consensus on the public good" with the "democratic process").
304 MichaelJohnston, Democracy Without Politics?Hidden Costs of Corruption andReform in
America, in CORRUPTION AND AMERtCAN PoLtrics, supra note 291, at 13, 16 (emphasis
omitted).
305 See, e.g., SusAN RosE-AcKERMAN, CoRPulTIoN AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 91 (1999) (defining corruption as the "misuse of public power for
private gain"); Kleinig & Heffeman, supranote 297, at 3 ("If there is an orthodox account
of corruption, it is that it consists in the improper use of public office for private gain.");
Mark E. Warren, Political Corruption as Duplicitous Exclusion, 37 Pot. Sci. & POL 803, 803
(2006) (noting the "received conception of political corruption" as "the abuse of public
office for private gain"); WORLD BANK INSTrruE, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION INDEx, http://
info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) ("Control of
corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain . . . .").
Three definitional issues are worth noting at the outset. First, many definitions of
corruption emphasize the "misuse" (or "abuse") of public office for private gain. That, of
course, raises the question of what counts as "misuse" versus acceptable "use." The same
concern can be alternatively refraned as involving the distinction between "improper personal gain" (which I call "private gain") and "proper personal gain," e.g., one's standard
salary and approved perquisites. For simplicity's sake, I would rather locate the disapprobation inherent in the term "misuse" in the term "privategain" and the critical nexus to
"public office." Hence, I define corruption simply as the use of public office for private
gain.
Second, the definition of corruption adopted here is in certain respectsa narrow onewhat political scientists would categorize as individualcorruption. But academics also refer
to a broader institutional (or "systemic" form of) corruption. See, e.g., TuOMrsON, supra
note 293, at 25 (distinguishing individual and institutional corruption); Michael A. Genovese, The Politics of Corruption and the Coruption of Politics, in CoRuwrboN AND AMEIcAN
Potrrics, supra note 291, at 1, 3 (distinguishing individual and systemic corruption, in
which public office is used not for private gain, such as lining one's own pockets, but
political gain, such as furthering one's ideological causes, political party's fate, or even personal political ambitions). The notion of institutional (or systemic) corruption certainly
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simple core understanding, the very first page of the House Ethics
Manual commands that members, officers, and employees of the
House "should not in any way use their office for private gain."oe
Privategain. Since at least the time of Cicero, it has been "beyond
debate that officials of the government are relied upon to act for the
public interest not their own enrichment."307 But not all forms of personal enrichment are dubious. After all, members are not required to
make a vow of poverty before holding office.so8 Indeed, the Framers
endorsed the idea that members of Congress should be paid salaries
on the view that being independently wealthy should not be a qualifiTherefore, the notion of private gain
cation for elected office.s
must recognize that some forms of personal gain3a 0 are necessary or
incidental, and thus appropriate, to performing one's political role.
As proposed by Andrew Stark, "private gain" signifies that the
public officials are enjoying the gain in question outside of their official roles. "The modifier private suggests a kind of gain-a trip on a
corporate jet, attending an association meeting at a resort, an all-expense paid trip to a charity event-that does not, or ought not, or
need not, redound to the official as part of his or her job."311 Thus,
resonates with much of the electorate (e.g., the popular rhetoric on "corrupting" but lawful campaign contributions). However, there is much less consensus about what constitutes institutional corruption and whether anything should be done about it. Compare
Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in CampaignFinanceReform 1995 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 111,
112 (criticizing the notion of institutional corruption), and David A. Strauss, What Is the
Goal of Campaign FinanceRefonm, 1995 U. C. LEGAL. F. 141, 142, with LAwRENcE LEssI,
REPUBLIC, LosT: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 226-47 (2011)
(highlighting the importance of focusing on more systemic forms of corruption, referred
to as "dependence corruption"). Consequently, trying to draw a bright line between institutional corruption and hardball politics is difficult. Thankfully, legislator insider trading
falls squarely in the more easily defined category of individual corruption. For purposes of
my analysis, I mean to emphasize private gain (as defined here) and not political gain,
which raises another set of complex questions about what constitutes the proper (and improper) pursuit of political gain. See infra text accompanying notes 310-18.
Third, the definition of corruption advanced here is not coextensive with illegality.
Indeed, there may be conduct falling under my definition that is not currently illegal but
nonetheless arguably corrupt. This makes sense in light of the fact that there is almost
always a gap between prevailing cultural understandings and what the law contemporane-

ously proscribes.
so
HousE Emcs MANUAL, supra note 217, at 1; see id at 185 (citing Rule 23, cl. 3 for
the proposition that the House Code of Official Conduct prohibits a House member or
other employee "from using his or her official position for personal gain").
307 JoHN T. NooNAN, Ja., BRImEs704 (1984).
30
Cf THompsoN, supranote 293, at 50 (noting that a governor convicted of political
corruption was nevertheless "right in assuming public office is not like entering a
monastery").
309 Id.

310 By "personal gain," I mean to include gain that not only directly benefits the official in question but also inures to the official's family or friends.
311
ANDREw STARK, CoNFUC-r o INTEREST INst
AMERICAN Pusuc LiF 76 (2000) (defining
the term "private gain from public office").
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private gain is a form of personal gain that is supererogaty--neither
part of the explicit compensation allocated to the public official nor
culturally viewed as an acceptable or unavoidable perquisite of the
role.31 2 In other words, only if the personal gain in question is neither
necessary nor incidental to one's official role can the gain qualify as
private gain.313 Conversely, "[i]f the official's responsibilities required
the official to board the corporate aircraft, or be present at the association meeting, or attend the charity event, then there would be no
314
'private' gain, just the exercise of office."
From Public Office. It is not enough, however, that the gain be private in order for the underlying act to constitute an abuse of public
office. The gain must also somehow flow from the official's public office. In other words, there must be a proximate causal nexus between
the public role and the private enrichment. At minimum, it must be
shown that the official would never have received the invitation to ride
the corporate jet, attend the association meeting at the resort, or participate in the all-expenses paid charity event butfor her public role. If
the causal nexus is absent, the official's conduct is not improper because the opportunity did not flow from the public role. For example,
if the official can demonstrate that prior to becoming a public official
she had routinely received the same invitation to attend the all-expenses paid charity event, the causal link would arguably be severed
and the alleged private gain would not be viewed as improper.315 In
addition, the official must have somehow intended"16 to receive the
gain in question in order for her conduct to be deemed improper.317
312 Two clarifications are in order. First, by referring to private gain as being "superogatory," I do not suggest that private gain is in any sense virtuous, which is a common
connotation of that term. Second, the definition of "private gain" that I adopt would generally exclude longstanding explicit perquisites of congressional office because they ordinarily serve an important political function. For example, the proper purpose of the
franking privilege is to aid communication with constituents. However, if the franking
privilege is misused by members to for personal purposes in contravention of rules, it
would amount to "private gain" under this definition. For discussion of the franking privilege, see THompsoN, supra note 293, at 73. Also, my definition of "private gain" would
exclude certain noneconomic forms of personal gain, such as enhanced prestige or increased name recognition, because they are unavoidable consequences of, and thus incidental to, holding office and for those reasons deemed unobjectionable.
313 For simplicity, I have chosen to locate the disapprobation that attaches to "corruption" within the definition of"private gain" and the nexus to "public office." For a further
explanation, see supma note 305.
14 Cf STARK, supra note 311, at 76 ("To then say that such private gain flows from
public office implies that the official enjoys such gain only because she happens to occupy
that official role." (emphasis added)).
315
I at 76.
316 Cf Underkuffler, supra note 301, at 9 (arguing that corruption requires "intentional misconduct" (emphasis omitted)).
317 A de minimis level of intention is implied by the intentionality-laden word "use" in
the phrase "use of one's public office for private gain."
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This is merely to acknowledge that inadvertent or accidental accruals
of alleged private gain can hardly be regarded as "corrupt."31s
Even if this "private gain from public office" definition seems
plausible, some readers might object that it remains formalistic without some deeper justification. After all, what is so wrong about using
one's public office for private gain such that it deserves the pejorative
label of "corruption"? Why should a public official respect the border
between public and private? What is the harm that is captured by the
phrase, "the pollution of the public by the private"?319
In some cases, the harm to the government or to the general public will not be so clear. Take, for example, bribery in the public procurement context-the classic case of private gain from public office.
One common argument that bribed officials assert is that there is no
victim.3 2 0 After all, it is certainly plausible that the bribed official
would have awarded the contract to the briber anyway, even without
the bribe.3 21 However, as has been extensively documented in the
corruption literature, private gain from public office generates certain
important but sometimes indirect harms. A full explication of the
kinds of harms is beyond the scope of this Article, but I have discussed
them elsewhere. 322 For purposes of this Article, I will briefly summarize one important set of harms-the "temptation costs" incurred by
the use of public office for private gain.
When public officials-whether elected or appointed-pursue
private gain from public office, they are invariably tempted to make
decisions to advance their own financial interests without regard to
the interests of the public. This distortion of incentives risks a serious

318 Because my definition ofcorruption is not coextensive with civil or criminal illegality, I do not wish to further specify any mens rea conditions attaching to the intentionality
of conduct, as those conditions will differ depending on whether the case is civil or criminal. Moreover, it is possible that conduct can be regarded as corrupt but not unlawful.
319 The phrase comes from THompsoN, supranote 293, at 28. This is not to say that
private gain from public office is normatively problematic for consequentialist reasons
only. There may also be deontological objections to private gain from public office, which
may not be well captured by terms such as "costs" or "harms."
320 Omar Azfar et al., The Causes and Consequences of Comption, 573 ANNAus Am. AcAD.
Pot. & Soc. SQ. 42, 47 (2001).
321 Under federal law, acceptance of a bribe is illegal, regardless of whether the bribe
actually influenced the official's conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 346
(2008); United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 675 (2004); see also United States v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 693 (1997) ("[A] defendant violates [the federal antibribery statute] by
merely seeking or demanding a bribe, regardless of whether he accepts or even agrees to
accept it.").
322 See Kim, GovernmentalInsiderTrading,supranote 34, at 60-61 (discussing the "temptation, distraction and legitimacy costs" of public corruption in the form of governmental
insider trading and drawing linkages with findings in the political science and economic
literatures).
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323

misallocation of government financial resources.
For example, empirical work has found high levels of corruption to be associated with
underinvestment in education and overinvestment in public infrastructure.324 This stems from the fact that education provides fewer
opportunities for bribes. As a result, public officials in responsible
positions tend to channel their energies toward public infrastructure
projects, where the opportunities for self enrichment are greater.325
Gradually and incrementally, the pursuit of private gain from public
office facilitates the pollution of the public by the private.
Having justified this basic definition of corruption, we can now
apply it to legislator insider trading. First, any gain arising out of trading on material, nonpublic information acquired through one's legislative position clearly constitutes supererogatory financial gainprivate gain. Profits earned from insider trading are not part of the
explicit compensation allocated to members. Nor is there anything in
the job description of legislators or in the nature of their legislative
tasks that requires them to use their own personal funds to trade in
any stocks, let alone based on information gleaned through their work
in the legislature. Further, overwhelming public opinion against legislator insider trading suggests that such trading is not culturally viewed
as one of the acceptable perquisites of legislators' jobs.326 Moreover,
no federal or state legislator has publicly defended this practice. In
fact, when members of Congress were directly confronted by the press
with allegations of insider trading, they reacted defensively and evasively.327 Second, such trading opportunities flow from their public
office (i.e., they would not have such lucrative trading opportunities
but for the information gained by virtue of their office). Thus, legislator insider trading fits squarely within the definition of public corruption-the use of public office for private gain.
323 See, eg., KIfGAARD, supra note 296, at 38 (summarizing studies of harms of public
corruption); TANjA RABt, PRIVATE CoRurTioN AND ITS Acrons: INsoIrrs INTO THE SuBjEgc
TivE DECSION MAING PROCESSES
62-64 (2008) (discussing studies on the harms of corrupt
procurements).
324 See Rose-AcKRMAN, supra note 305, at 2-3 (summarizing findings).
325 Seeid.
326 A recent public opinion poll reports that the "vast majority of Americans (86%)
believe insider trading laws should be enforced against members ofCongress." Newjudicial
Watch-Haris iteractivePoll Sends Warningto Washington Politicians,JumLAL WATCH (Jan. 20,
2012), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/weekly-updates/new-poll-and-stealingdemocracy/.
327 See .g., ConfantingPelosi on Insider Trading, CBSNEws (June 17, 2012, 3:55 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504803_162-57323518-10391709/confronting-pelosi-oninsider-trading/?tag=segementExtraScrollerhousing (discussing how no congressmen
were willing to meet with 60 Minutes reporters to discuss insider-motivated investments and
showing RepresentativesJohn Boehner and Nancy Pelosi actively avoiding questions on the
issue).
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Moreover, this definitional fit is neither accidental nor merely
formal. The temptation costs that justify the basic definition clearly
apply in this domain. For example, suppose that the Chair of the
House Appropriations Committee believes that a particular military
vehicle, manufactured by a small publicly traded corporation, is ultimately unsuitable for the Defense Department's purposes. But suppose that he thinks it is a close call because there is no obviously
better alternative in the marketplace. Suppose further that his four
children, who are each one year apart in age, will soon be attending
college. If he advocates strongly in favor of the military vehicle, there
is a good chance that the expenditure will be approved. And if he
also purchases stock in advance, he stands to gain a hefty profit, which
could help pay for college tuition. Because of his personal financial
situation, he will be sorely tempted to advocate in favor of the military
expenditure, notwithstanding his understanding of the merits.
The above hypothetical makes clear that legislator insider trading
risks distorting the legislator's incentives and misallocating government financial resources. And it is not just that legislators will be
tempted to cast a bad vote. Temptations, unchecked by law, are likely
to pervade all forms of legislative activity, such as making phone calls,
setting agendas, giving speeches, subpoenaing witnesses, asking questions in hearings, and so on. Indeed, entrepreneurial legislators
might more proactivelys2 s try to hustle up trading opportunities by
redirecting research resources, reorganizing their offices, and rewriting the rules of legislative ethics.3m
In sum, public corruption can plausibly be defined as the use of
public office for private gain. This definition makes sense in light of
the temptation costs incurred because of private gain from public office. And legislator insider trading not only fits the definition but also
generates these same costs. As a result, we can view and classify legislator insider trading as a form of public corruption. Now that I've defended a plausible definition of (public) corruption and shown that
legislator insider trading falls within that definition, the task is to
demonstrate that one core purpose of the common law of fiduciaries
is to deter corruption.

328 For example, with respect to bribery, economic research indicates that once bribery becomes pervasive in a society, government officials do not remain passive recipients of
cash but rather become active extortionists of fees. KuTGAARD, supra note 296, at 41-42.
Citizens, too, increasingly "invest their energies in the pursuit of illicit favors." Id. at 44.
329 Cf Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption:Greed, Culture, and the State, 120 YAz L.J. ON
UNE 125, 135 (2010) (describing the potential effects of unchecked corruption).
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C. Fiduciary Law's Norm Against Corruption
Fiduciary law encompasses myriad contexts. As I've pointed out,
its ad hoc development and resulting fuzzy boundaries have frustrated
the legal scholars who study it. In response, scholars have earnestly
searched for unifying principles that coherently explain why certain
relationships are subject to fiduciary obligations 3 o-to partial success.
Like others,33 ' I doubt that a single set of principles could successfully
rationalize the various species of fiduciaries 32 without resorting to extreme imprecision and risking overinclusiveness.333 As Deborah DeMott has explained: "The evolution of fiduciary obligation ... owed
much to the situation-specificity and flexibility that were Equity's
hallmarks.... [A]s Equity developed to correct and supplement the
common law, the interstitial nature of Equity's doctrines and functions made these doctrines and functions resistant to precise definition."3 4 Cognizant of these difficulties, my goal is not to propose any
grand theory of fiduciary law. All that I seek to demonstrate is that
one core purpose of fiduciary law is anti-corruption.
Although numerous doctrines within fiduciary law appear to target corruption in the private sector,335 one particular doctrine best
illustrates an anti-corruption norm for the public context (although
certainly not limited to the public sector). In several cases, only a few
330 See,e.g., Fox-DECENT, supra noe 163, at 4; TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDuCIARY IAW 4-6
(2011); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L &
EcoN. 425, 427 (1993); Leib & Ponet, Fiduciay Representation, supra note 163, at 183; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations,138 U. PA. L REv. 1675,
1684 (1990).
331 See, eg., FINN, supranote 133, at 1 (arguing that use of the term "fiduciary" merely
provides "a veil behind which individual rules and principles have been developed" and
that it is "meaningless to talk of fiduciary relationships as such"); DeMott, Beyond Metaphor
supra note 135, at 915 ("Described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is a device that
enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one
person's discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's relationship with another. This instrumental description is the only general assertion about
fiduciary obligation that can be sustained."); Sealy, supra note 129, at 73 (noting that "we
cannot proceed any further in our search for a generaldefinition of fiduciary relationships,"
suggesting that fiduciary relationships must be defined "class by class," and positing four
categories of fiduciary relationships).
332 See Sealy, supra note 129, at 74-79, for a description of four categories of fiduciary
relationships.
333 See Frankel, supra note 147, at 797 ("The differences among fiduciaries may be so
great that treating them as a group would require a very high level of generality, rendering
a unified examination of little use.").
334 DeMott. Beyond Metaphor, supra note 135, at 881 (footnote omitted).
335 An anti-corruption norm (as applied to the private sector) is apparent in cases
which illustrate a judicial impulse against pursuing selfish gain through one's fiduciary
position. For cases restricting the fiduciary's ability to obtain or use lease renewals and
reversions, opportunities, and confidential information for selfish gain, see, for example,
Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934); Zeiden v. Oliphant, 54 N.Y.S.2d 27
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945); Keech v. Sanford, (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch.) 223. For a definition of private corruption, see Kim, Governmental Insider Trading, supra note 34, at 46-48.
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of which are discussed below, courts have proscribed the use of public
office for private gain. They have done so by applying the so-called
rule against secret profits,33 6 which forbids fiduciaries from accepting
bribes or secret commissions.337
The rule against secret profits (or the rule against bribes and secret commissions) emanates from the "exclusive benefit principle,"3 3 8
which generally requires the fiduciary "not to use her discretionary
power to arrogate to herself personal benefits from her positioneven if such benefits do not directly harm the beneficiary."339 To assure this fidelity, the law provides that it is appropriate to structure the
fiduciary's compensation to promote the proper alignment of the fiduciary's incentives with the beneficiary's interest.3 4o Since a fiduciary's overt compensation represents the amount thought to be
sufficient to induce the desired performance, there would be "no
need to permit an indeterminate amount of additional, covert compensation."34 ' And not only are covert rewards viewed as unnecessary,
they are also risky to the beneficiary's interests. Therefore, it is important "to deter those fiduciaries from even approaching the borders of
self-aggrandizing behavior."342
The following three cases nicely illustrate the anti-corruption
norm for the public context. First, consider a paradigmatic bribe in
which there is "an explicit exchange of a specific benefit for a specific
official action (or inaction)."343 Attorney-General v. Goddard, for in356 See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus FiduciaryDuties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINEss 55, 73-74 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
(noting that in older case law on corporate managers, courts expressed this rule as a duty
not to take "secret profits," i.e., compensation that is not "expressly provided to the manager
in the governing statutes, charter and bylaws, and employment contracts (if any)").
33
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THnD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006) (prohibiting an agent from
acquiring "a material benefit from a third party in connection with transactions conducted
or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or otherwise through the agent's use of
the agent's position").
338 Victor Brudney, ContractandFiduciasyDuty in CosporateLaw, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595,601
(1997) [hereinafter Brudney, FiduciatyDuty] (defining the "exclusive benefit principle" as
the notion "that the fiduciary's duty of loyalty requires the trustee or agent to act as the
beneficiary's (or principal's) alter ego and act only as the latter would act for himself'); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF AGENCY § 8.01, (2006) ("An agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship");

RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TRUSTs § 170 (1935) (noting that the duty of a trustee is "to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary").
339 Leib & Ponet, FiduciaryRepresentation, supra note 163, at 188-89.
340 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF AGENcy § 8.01, cmt. b (2006) ("A principal may
choose to structure the basis on which an agent will be compensated so that the agent's
interests are concurrent with those of the principal.").
M Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities,94
HAv. L. REv. 997, 999 (1981) (emphasis added).
342 Brudney, FduciaryDuty, supra note 338, at 602.
343 Daniel H. Lowenstein, PoliticalBtibery and the Intermediate Theory ofPolitics, 32 UCLA
L. REv. 784, 787 (1985).
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stance, involved the case of an English police sergeant who was convicted of accepting bribes to ignore crimes that he was responsible for
monitoring.34 In the civil case, the Crown sued to recover the payments, and the sergeant demurred.345
According to the court, the question presented was whether the
rule against secret profits in agency law applied to this case, even
though the sergeant was not entrusted with a pecuniary interest-i.e.,
the sergeant was not employed in a commercial or financial capacity-and there was no pecuniary harm to the Crown.346 The court
concluded that the rule applied "because it is contrary to equity that
the agent or servant should retain money so received without the
knowledge of his master."347 After all, "this officer was employed at
this time as an agent to make inquiries and got this money in the
course of those inquiries." 3 a In other words, the officer received the
bribe (private gain) by reason of his position (public office). According to the court, it did not matter whether there was "any injury in
fact" or, more specifically, whether the principal's "pecuniary interest
is damaged in fact or not."349
In overruling the demurrer, the court emphasized that the sergeant's position was a fiduciary one. Specifically, the court noted that
there was a fiduciary relationship "not because he received into his
hands any property of his employers or did not, but because he was
under an obligation to use the information which he got for the purpose of his employer, certainly not to use it for his own profit."ss0 In
other words, there was an expectation that the sergeant would use his
public office for the exclusive benefit of the Crown and not for private
gain.
Goddard involved a case of payment (private gain) in exchange
for an official action or, more accurately, official police inaction (from
public office). But courts have extended liability to payment in exchange not for any official action but simply the use of one's official
5
status. The frequently cited case of Reading v. Attorney-Generalo
is illustrative. In Reading,a smuggling ring paid a British army sergeant in
the Royal Army Medical Corps (stationed in Egypt) to escort contraband around the city of Cairo. By sitting-in full military uniformon the front seat of a civilian lorry loaded with the illicit cargo, the
Attorney-General v. Goddard, [19291 98 L.J.K.B. 743 at 744 (Eng.).
Id.
346 Id. at 745.
34
Id. at 746.
348 I
34
Id. at 745.
350 Id.
351
[1951] AC. 507 (Eng.); see Reading v. The King, [19481 2 K.B. 268 (Eng.) (prior
history).
344
345
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sergeant enabled the smugglers to pass Egyptian police lines and
avoid arrest.352 The sergeant was subsequently apprehended, courtmartialed, and imprisoned for two years.353 After his release from
prison, he brazenly brought a petition to recover the money that the
Crown seized from his apartment. 54 On appeal, the court held that
the Crown was entitled to retain the sums confiscated.355
In granting the Crown's requested remedy, the court pointed to a
pattern of cases that had employed the rule against secret profits to
recover an agent's or servant's sums, regardless of whether the master
had suffered any detriment in fact. 356 This was important because
"the Crown in this case . . . has lost no profits [and] suffered no
damage." 5 7
The court went on to apply the rule to the particular facts
presented. Addressing the issue of whether the nexus to the sergeant's position was sufficient to warrant the remedy, the court noted
that it did not matter that the sergeant was acting outside the scope of
his employment and thus outside his official capacity when he earned
the money. Rather, what mattered was that the sergeant used his official position to earn it:
He nevertheless was using his position as sergeant in His Majesty's
Army and the uniform to which his rank entitled him to obtain the
money which he received. In my opinion any official position,

whether marked by a uniform or not, which enables the holder to
earn money by its use gives his master a right to receive the money
so earned even though it was earned by a criminal act.358
In sum, the plurality of the court premised its holding on the
sergeant's official status, which enabled him to accept the bribe.359
Interestingly, the plurality stopped just short of expressly requiring a
fiduciary relationship to justify the remedy granted. However, it acknowledged that the relationship in question was a fiduciary one in "a
wide and loose sense"3 o and, on that basis, the Crown was alternatively entitled to the money.36 The concurrence was less equivocal on
this issue. It expressed agreement with the lower court that the sergeant "owes to the Crown a duty as fully fiduciary as the duty of a
servant to his master or of an agent to his principal,"362 despite the
352
5

34
ss
356
35

358
359
360

361
362

Reading v. The King, [1948] 2 KB. 268 at 268.
Id at 269.
Reading v. Attorney General, [19511 A.C. 507 at 508.
Id.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id at

515.
516.
514.

508.
516.
508.
517.
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fact that the sergeant was technically neither an agent nor a servant
under the law. 65
Recall that the first case I described, Goddard, was an example of
money in exchange for an official's inaction. The second case, Reading, was an example of money (private gain) in exchange for an unofficial action that nevertheless exploited some official status (from
public office), as signaled by the uniform. Finally, consider, United
States v. Drummnrn 64 a case in which a breach of fiduciary duty was found
when the fiduciary neither took official action nor exploited his official status. In Drumm, a United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) poultry inspector surreptitiously moonlighted by doing parttime consulting for a private poultry processing plant in violation of
USDA policy.365 The federal government sued for breach of fiduciary
duty. The district court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant,
but the appellate court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case 66
In explaining its holding, the appellate court complained that
"the defendant had secretly placed himself in a position of conflicting
interests and loyalties. This he had no right to do."3 67 The court then
went on to highlight the potential harms that might arise from this
conflict of interest: by secretly accepting this second employment "involving duties adverse to those he owed the government," the defendant "compromised to a great extent his position as an impartial
poultry inspector and his usefulness to the government."368
Although the court claimed that the defendant's outside private
employment carried duties adverse to those owed to the government,
there was no evidence of adverseness. Indeed, the reported facts
strongly suggest that the private company was genuinely interested in
improving the quality of its poultry and hired the USDA employee to
further that purpose.369 Nothing in the factual record suggested that
the defendant was discouraged from discharging his main responsibility as a government poultry inspector-to ensure that federal standards of sanitation and wholesomeness were met by all companies
who voluntarily enrolled in the USDA's inspection program.370 The
defendant had simply earned some secret money "on the side."
363
364
365
367

Id. at 517 (Lord Normand, concurring).
329 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1964).
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 112.

368

Id.

366

369 For example, the employee advised the company on how to handle chickens after
delivery so as to reduce contamination. "He assisted Ithe company] in tracking down and
eliminating the source of discoloration of ducks received by producers . . . ." Id. at 111.
370 See id. at 110-11 (describing the voluntary nature of program).
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Nevertheless, according to the court, "[t]he fact that there is no
evidence that defendant passed bad poultry or that the reputation of
the government's inspection program was damaged by defendant's
conduct would not bar recovery." 71 After all, the court went on, the
"agent has the power to conceal his fraud and hide the injury done his
principal."37 Accordingly, it would be unwise to require a showing of
actual harm where an agent acquired a "secret benefit . .. out of his
agency"** (that is, a private gain from his public office). The court
then noted the crucial importance of holding public officials to
account:
The larger interests of public justice will not tolerate, under any
circumstances, that a public official shall retain any profit or advantage which he may realize through the acquirement of an interest in
conflict with his fidelity as an agent. If he takes any gift, gratuity or
benefit in violation of his duty, or acquires any interest adverse to
his principal, without a full disclosure, it is a betrayal of his trust and
a breach of confidence, and he must account to his principal for all
he has received.374
As the above three cases demonstrate-along a single, consistent
doctrinal strand-fiduciary law prohibits public fiduciaries from taking secret profits. It does so prophylactically, regardless of whether
any actual harm to the beneficiary can be shown, so long as there is a
nexus to the fiduciary's position. The underlying policy is anti-corruption, preventing private gain from public office.
If we join this insight (that fiduciary law contains an anti-corruption norm) with the prior analysis (concluding that legislator insider
trading counts as corruption), we see the appropriateness of interpreting fiduciary law in a way that reaches legislators, without regard to
whether actual harm to the relevant beneficiaries can be shown. This
appeal to anti-corruption deepens the justification for analogizing legislators to private trustees, directors, and partners. Moreover, this
analysis helps us see that Fuchs and PodeIl, two cases that have recognized legislators-state and federal-as fiduciaries, were also targeting
corruption. In employing traditional analogical reasoning to find legislators to be fiduciaries for purposes of federal insider trading law,
judges can rest assured that they are not stretching fiduciary law unrecognizably or arbitrarily to pursue some objective that is alien to the
doctrine.

371

Id. at 113.

37

Id. (quoting Carter, 217 U.S. at 305).
1I (quoting Carter, 217 U.S. at 305).

372
373

I (quoting United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305 (1910)).
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IV
OBJECTIONS

I have argued that courts could find that legislators owe fiduciary
duties to certain beneficiaries for purposes of federal insider trading
law. If courts impose such duties, then legislators who trade on material, nonpublic information could be held liable under classical and
misappropriation theories. Now I will answer some objections to my
argument.3 7 5
A. Judicial Activism
Some readers may worry that this common-law-like extension of
who counts as a "fiduciary" amounts to unwarranted judicial activism.
For example, it's one thing to say that corporate insiders are fiduciaries of their own shareholders who happen to be on the other side of
their trades. It's quite another thing to say (as the objection goes)
that state legislators are fiduciaries of citizen-investors on the other
side of their trades. The latter seems to be a far more radical extension of fiduciary law than the former.
This concern, although understandable, loses much force when
one takes a historical view of insider trading law, examines its evolution, and appreciates how equally radical prior judicial extensions
have been. Put another way, including legislators under a "fiduciary"
label is no more activist than various other extensions that courts
made long ago and now view as uncontroversial, black-letter insider
trading law.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's original affirmation
of the classical theory of insider trading in Chiarellain 1980. At the
time, the common law tort of misrepresentation-the basis forJustice
Powell's opinion in Chiarella-provided meager support for the proposition that a corporate insider owes a fiduciary duty to the
375 Some of the following objections are constitutional in nature. In answering them, I
remain focused on the doctrine because the relevant constitutional objections appear not
to be overwhelming. In this type of discussion, one can always "go deeper," for example,
by interrogating competing constitutional values and policies that undergird the doctrine.
However, exploring such arguments may mislead readers into thinking thatjudges will rely
on policy considerations untethered to doctrine when evaluating these constitutional objections, which is unlikely to be the case. Moreover, exploring constitutional policy arguments in depth goes far beyond the scope (and strict space constraints) of this already
lengthy Article. Suffice it to say that, for purposes of this Part, if one were inclined to
explore the underlying constitutional policies, one must take into account the perspective
that the Constitution may also contain strong anti-corruption principles. Forjust such an
argument, see Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Conuption Principle, 94 CotNEL L REV. 341
(2009). For a critique of that argument, see Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the
Scope of Profeor Teaoout's Anti-CorruptionIWtncie, 107 Nw. U. L REV. 1 (2012).
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376

Prior to Chiarella,the
counterparty in an open-market transaction.
weight of authority found no such duty to investors trading in the impersonal securities markets.377 Indeed, the majority rule at the time
found no liability for insider trading executed over an anonymous exchange.3 78 At the time, courts opining on this issue distinguished between face-to-face transactions where, they thought, investors were
justified in relying on an insider's duty to disclose 37 and open-market
transactions where, they thought, no such justification existed because
it was impossible to know whether an insider was on the other side of
the trade. On an anonymous exchange like the New York Stock Exchange, there is no bargaining, and the decision to buy and the decision to sell are completely independent. As a result, in such a
transaction, it is impossible to show any reliance or injury stemming
from the insider's nondisclosure.38o
Moreover, if we go further back in time, say, to 1951, we see that
the majority rule at the time did not even impose fiduciary obligations
in many face-to-face transactions. As Richard Painter and his colleagues have pointed out, the so-called "majority" rule at the time
held that "officers and directors [were] subject to a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its shareholders only in dealings with or on behalf of the corporation."38 ' Hence, in most jurisdictions, officers and
directors could "trade freely in the stock of their own corporation in
376 See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law andjusticePoweWs Legacy
for the Law ofInsiderTrading 78 B.tJ. L. REv. 13, 22 (1998) (noting that "the common law of
deceit provides scant support for [the position in CareUlla that a corporate insider defrauds a shareholder" when the insider simply trades on the open market); see also Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933) (holding that directors do not "occupy the
position of trustee toward individual stockholders" and that there was "no fiduciary relation between them and the plaintiff in the matter of the sale of his stock" (quoting Blabon
v. Hay, 169 N.E. 268, 271 (Mass. 1929))).
37
See Pritchard, supranote 376, at 23.
378 To be sure, a minority of courts eventually came to adopt the "special facts" doctrine, in which special circumstances can render an insider's silence in a face-to-face transaction unconscionable and thus warrant the imposition of a duty of full disclosure. That
said, cases adopting this doctrine are easily distinguishable from transactions over impersonal exchanges. See id. at 25 (distinguishing special facts doctrine from other cases); see
also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909) (creating the special facts doctrine). While
there were a few states which required disclosure of nonpublic information to shareholders
even in the absence of special circumstances, they did so only for face-to-face transactions,
which are thus distinguishable from stock market transactions. See Anabtawi, supra note
106, at 865 (citing Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903)).
3
See Alison Grey Anderson, Frand,Fiduciaries,andInsider Trading,10 HosTRA L. REv.
341, 366-67 (1982) ("Silence by a fiduciary is fraudulent primarily because the beneficiary
is likely to interpret that silence in a face-to-face transaction as meaning that the fiduciary is
aware of no additional material information.").
380 LANGEVOORT, suPra note 42, § 2:3, at 2-6 ("Given the essential independence of
buyer and seller decisions, causation and injury flowing from any nondisclosure are difficult to trace.").
381 Painter, Krawiec & Williams, supra note 43, at 162 n.34 (citing Louis Loss, SEcUIuiEs REGULATION 824 (1st ed. 1951)).
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an individual capacitywithout any affirmative disclosure obligation, so
long as they did not engage in active misrepresentations or halftruths."s82 Therefore, as long as they traded stock in their own account
and not in their representative capacities, officers and directors did
not owe fiduciary duties of disclosure to the shareholders of their
corporation.383
Even if we accept as uncontroversial the proposition that corporate insiders owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholders when
trading on an exchange, there was almost no common law support for
the proposition that a corporate insider owed a special duty to purchasers and not just sellers of the company's shares." 4 Unless purchasing
investors already own company shares, they are not current but prospective shareholders of the company. Therefore, it is the consummation of the particular transaction with the insider that brings the
investor into a fiduciary relation with the insider. Accordingly, before
that transaction is completed, purchasers are mere strangers to the
corporate insider.
The Supreme Court's only response to the problem presented by
the common law was to quote Judge Learned Hand:
[T]he director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer
by the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to

use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the
buyer had become one. 8 5
Judge Hand's statement, although characteristically eloquent, is not
an argument. After all, the "sorry distinction" is grounded in corporate law, which has historically treated shareholders and nonshareholders differently. Moreover, this "sorry distinction" was the
86
prevailing law of the day. 3
There are more examples ofjudicial extensions that we currently
view to be normal, indeed banal, but that at one time may have been
controversial. For example, for centuries, courts did not regard ordinary employees as fiduciaries because they exercised very little discretionary authority and did not ordinarily occupy positions of trust and
382 Id. (emphasis added).
383 Of course, even at the time, this majority rule was slowly giving way to the minority
view that "corporate insiders are subject to a fiduciary duty when dealing with shareholders
of their corporation and thus must make full disclosure of all material facts." Id. Also,
according to Louis Loss, the majority rule had merged into the "special facts" doctrine. Id.
384 See Pritchard, supranote 376, at 26.
385 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)).
386 As Adam Pritchard notes, "[a] Ithough this distinction may be 'sorry,' it is the common law rule." Pritchard, supra note 376, at 26.
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387

confidence toward their employer.
This changed somewhat in the
twentieth century when a number of cases began extending the fiduciary status to mere employees,m although even today not all states
hold that employees are presumptively fiduciaries. 38 9 However, it is
now clear that courts deem administrative employees to be fiduciaries
for purposes of federal insider trading law.390 Indeed, courts have
held a secretary,39 a copyholder for a financial printer,39 2 and an aide
in the audio-visual department39 3 to be fiduciaries under insider trading law.
Of course, one could flip this evidence around to lament that we
are on a slippery slope towards ever-expanding insider trading liability
and that we must draw the proverbial line in the sand here and now,
with legislators. But such a plea presumes that the expansions in the
past and the expansion at issue here have been bad ones. Until that
substantive case has been made, suffice it to say that, for purposes of
this objection, legislator insider trading is normatively problematic for
387 See e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1934) ("A mere
employee of a corporation does not ordinarily occupy a position of trust or confidence
toward his employer unless he is also an agent in respect to the matter under consideration."); Palmer v. Cypress Hill Cemetery, 25 N.E. 983, 985 (N.Y. 1890) ("The plaintiff was
not a trustee at the time the contract with him was made, and his relation . . . was not
fiduciary, but was that of an employe e] . . . .").
388 See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Sery. Co., 70 A.2d 5.7 (Del. Ch. 1949) (holding that when
an employee obtains secret information, the employee assumes a position of trust within
the company); Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 102 N.E. 441, 443 (Mass. 1913) (compelling
employee to assign a lease to detriment of his employer).
389 Se, eg., ATC Distrib. Grp. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 715 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[U]nlike 'mere' employees, officers of a company may be
presumed to have a fiduciary relationship to the company on that basis alone . . . .");
TalentBurst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265-66 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting
that in Massachusetts, an employee must occupy a position of trust and confidence in order to warrant fiduciary duties); Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmrt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278,
281 (Ga. 1998) ("The employee-employer relationship is not one from which the law will
necessarily imply fiduciary obligations. . . "). Some states require that an employee be a
"key employee" in order to be fiduciary. See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs. v. Sokolowski, 717
N.W.2d 781, 796 (Wis. 2005) ("If the employee is a 'key employee,' then a fiduciary duty of
loyalty will exist.").
$oo See e.g., United States v. Larrabee, 240 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming liability of law firm's director of fiduciary services under misappropriation theory); SEC v.
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding law firm's office-services manager to be a fiduciary for purposes of tipping liability).
391
See SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding an executive's secretary to be a fiduciary under misappropriation theory); Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7
(holding that a secretary occupies "a position of trust and confidence toward the corporation, with respect to the information so acquired, and the purchase of its stock for his own
account was a breach of the duty he owed to" the corporation).
392 SEC v. Materia, No. 82 Civ. 6225, 1983 WL 1396, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a#'4 745
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
393 SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July
28, 1992). vacated, Civ. A. No. 92 1336-RSWL(EEX), 1993 WL 43571 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22,
1993).

2013]

THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CONGRESS

913

the same reasons that public corruption is problematic, as I have argued more extensively elsewhere. 94 As for general anxiety about judicial activism, I explained in Part III.C that we can justify extending the
category of "fiduciary" to include legislators by reference to a policy
that is central to fiduciary law.395
In sum, the extension that I am calling for is no more radical
than prior extensions made under Rule lOb-5, which the Supreme
Court once referred to as a "judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn."396 It is certainly no more radical than
the judicially implied private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 or the
judicial creation of the insider trading causes of actions under the
classical and misappropriation theories. I am not asking for the creation of a brand new cause of action against legislators. I am merely
advocating that, should a court find itself in the position to so hold,
legislators could be recognized as fiduciaries under the already existing insider trading cause of action.
B.

Federalism

Nevertheless, is there something especially problematic-perhaps
constitutionally-with applying federal insider trading law to state legislators? One might object that applying the federal securities laws to
target the public corruption of state legislators (even if it is in the form
of legislator insider trading) represents an unconstitutional exercise
of federal power-an invalid federal "incursion on traditional state
power"397 (i.e., the power to police the conduct of its own officials).
But, as a doctrinal matter, this objection is not tenable given the fact
that since the 1980s, the federal government has successfully prosecuted thousands of state and local officials for acts of corruption.398
Further, many such prosecutions were based on federal statutes that
have not only survived constitutional scrutiny 9 but also were jurisdictionally rooted in the Commerce Clause 40 0-the same constitutional
394 See Kim, Goverunmental Insider Trading, supra note 34, at 61.
395 See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
396 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
397 George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-MailFraud,State Law and
Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 ConsEu. L. REv. 225, 250 (1997) (discussing the United States v.
Lopez Court's concern with protecting traditional state police power).
3e8 See George D. Brown, New Federalism's UnansweredQuestion: Who Should ProsecuteState
and Local Officials for PoliticalCorruption?, 60 WAsH. & LEE. L. REv. 417, 421 (2003).
399 See Adam H. Kurland, The GuaranteeClause as a Basisfor FederalProsecutionsof State
and Local Officials, 62 S, CAL. L. REv. 367, 370 (1989) (stating that the constitutionality of
statutes prosecuting state and local officials for corruption is well established).
400 See id (noting that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, the
Travel Act, and the Hobbs Act were all grounded in the Commerce Clause and survived
constitutional challenge). Public officials are also prosecuted under the federal mail fraud
statutes, which are grounded in the postal power.
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grounding for the federal securities laws, including the insider trading
prohibition.
And there should be little doubt that the federal insider trading
prohibition rests on constitutionally secure footing. First, unlike the
few federal statutes that have been invalidated on federalism
grounds,40 Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 (as does the whole of federal securities laws) 4 0 2 regulate what is clearly economic activity involving "instrumentalities of interstate commerce"40 3 and thus
substantially relates to interstate commerce.,0 Hence, the relevant
statute indisputably falls within the federal commerce power. Second,
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 both contain express jurisdictional elements that require the trier of fact to find a nexus with interstate cornmerce.405 This ensures, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the
activity in question is connected to interstate commerce.** Third, the
insider trading prohibition does not commandeer state resources,
which would be intrusive to state power; "it neither requires the states
to do anything nor imposes any financial burden on them."40
Fourth, as my arguments have suggested, the federal ban on insider
trading is nondiscriminatory and generally applicable; the same legislation applies equally to public officials and private parties. 40 Therefore, the use of federal securities laws to target legislator insider
401 Se e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (civil damages provision of
the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free
School Zones Act).
402 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate
Law. 58 VAND. L REv. 1573, 1585 n.29 (2005), for a discussion on the constitutionality of a
hypothetical complete federal displacement of state corporate law. It goes without saying
that if Congress has the power to displace state corporate law in its entirety, Congress
certainly has the power to regulate insider trading in its entirety.
403 Ryan K Stumphauzer, Note, Electronic Impdses, Digital Signals, and Federaljurisdiction: Congress's Commerce Clause Power in the TwentyFinst Centusy, 56 VAND. L REv. 277, 289
(2003). For a discussion of some lower courts' broad readings of the phrase "instrumentality of interstate commerce," see id. at 312-13.
404 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 ("Congress' commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce . . . .").
405 Section 10(b)'s prohibitions apply when a defendant uses "any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 78j. Likewise, Rule lOb-5 provides that it is unlawful "for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5.
406
Cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (striking down part of the statute because "it contains no

jurisdictional element which would ensure" that the prohibited activity affects interstate
commerce).
407 John C. Coffee. Jr., Modern Mail Fraud:The Restoration ofthe Public/PivateDistinction,
35 Am. Caum. L. Rev. 427,454-55 (1998) (observing that federal anti-corruption legislation
does not easily offend the anti-commandeering principle of New Yor v. United States).
408 See id at 455 (suggesting that Justice O'Connor created an exception to the federalism limits imposed in New Ybrk v. United States for legislation that "subjected a state to the
same legislation applicable to private parties").
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trading at the subnational level should survive federalism-based
challenges.
C. Speech or Debate Clause
The final major objection, which applies only to members of Congress and is relevant notwithstanding the STOCK Act, concerns the
Speech or Debate Clause, which reads in part: "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [members of Congress] shall not be questioned
in any other Place."409 This Clause immunizes members of Congress
from civil or criminal liability for "conduct necessary to perform their
duties within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."4x0 Such activity includes, for example, speech or debate in either House, voting,
drafting committee reports, and conduct at legislative committee
hearings.41 ' This Clause was designed to foster legislative independence and to avoid coercion or intimidation from the executive or
judicial branches of government. 412 In addition to securing the independence of the legislature, the Clause "serves the additional function
of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by
the Founders."413
The scope of the liability immunity is, however, not all encompassing. And the Speech or Debate Clause was not intended "simply
for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to
protect the integrity of the legislative process."41 4 As such, the immunity only "protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process."415 Thus, the actions
that are protected "must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee
and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage
4o9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; seeJoHN E. NowAK& RONALD D. RoTUNDA, TREATISE ON
CONsTirrTIONAL LAw 305-12 (8th ed. 2010) (explaining the history of the Speech or Debate Clause and the cases interpreting it). Of course, if a state constitution has a similar
clause, some of this analysis may cross-apply. Cf., e.g., Wilkins v. Gagliardi, 556 N.W.2d 171,
176-77 (Mich. App. 1996) ("The Speech or Debate Clause of the Michigan Constitution is
substantially similar to that of the United States Constitution . . . .").
410 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n.11 (1979) (quoting Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
411 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972).
412 Seee.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (noting that the Founders designed the Clause to foster legislative independence); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 ("The
Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide
freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch."); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1966) ("[The Clause]
prevent[]s intimidation by the executive .. .").
413 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178. For separate exploration of general separation of powers
principles, see supra note 35.
414 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507.
415 Gravel 408 U.S. at 616.
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or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters
which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House."4 1 6
To be clear, the Speech or Debate Clause does not grant blanket
immunity to members of Congress and does not convert them into
"super-citizens" above the law.4 1 7 As the Supreme Court explained:
Article 1, § 6, d. 1,as we have emphasized, does not purport to confer a general exemption upon Members of Congress from liability
or process in criminal cases. Quite the contrary is true. While the
Speech or Debate Clause recognizes speech, voting, and other legislative acts as exempt from liability that might otherwise attach, it
does not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an otherwise
valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative
aCtS. 418
Accordingly, notwithstanding the Clause, members of Congress have
been prosecuted for fraud,419 bribery,420 extortion, 421 violation of
honorarium laws, 4 2 2 and embezzlement.423
There is no reason to treat the trading of securities (in violation
of federal law) any differently. Such trades are not integral to the
legislative process and thus do not constitute any part of "legitimate
legislative activity" that warrants protection under the Speech or Debate Clause. In most cases, legislator insider trading will not involve
the making of any speech in Congress, the casting of any vote, or the
writing of any report-core legislative actions that the Constitution
shields from prosecutorial scrutiny. Instead, insider trading will involve a market trade made privately, intentionally without fanfare, and
on the basis of material, nonpublic information. The fact that such
416
417

IL at 625.
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516; see id. at 520 (rejecting "sweeping claims [that] would
render Members of Congress virtually immune from a wide range of crimes simply because
the acts in question were peripherally related to their holding office").
418
Gravel 408 U.S. at 626.
419 United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966) ("No argument is made, nor do
we think that it could be successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause reaches
conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to [illegally] influence the Department of
justice [and thereby defraud the United States], that is in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative process."). The Court did hold, however, that with respect to a
conspiracy charge that turned on dissecting both the text and motivation for a speech that
Johnson made during the legislative process, the Speech or Debate Clause would prevent
prosecution. Id. at 173-77. The Court was careful to guard against overreading. It explained, "[o]ur decision does not touch a prosecution which, though as here founded on a
criminal statute of general application, does not draw in question the legislative acts of the
defendant member of Congress or his motives for performing them." Id. at 185.
420 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 501 (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), (g)); United
States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 283 (3d Cir. 1994).
421
United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
422 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wright, 777 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
423 United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1302-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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information is obtained through some connection to Congress does
not mean that trading on such information suddenly becomes a legitimate or official act of Congress. 424
United States v. Brewster"-5 provides a useful precedent.426 Brewster, a former Senator, was prosecuted for violating various federal
anti-bribery laws. The Supreme Court wrote:
Taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative process or
function; it is not a legislative act. It is not, by any conceivable interpretation, an act performed as a part of or even incidental to the
role of a legislator. It is not an act resulting from the nature, and in
the execution, of the office. Nor is it a thing said or done by him, as
a representative,
office ..

in the

exercise of the functions of that

2.7

Just as a bribe is not a legislative act, neither is insider trading. The
Court also wisely observed that if the goal of the Speech or Debate
Clause is legislative independence, then allowing bribes would
threaten independence far more than permitting criminal
prosecutions.4 2 8
In addition to providing liability immunity for legislative acts,
however, the Speech or Debate Clause provides a testimonial and an
evidentiary privilege.429 So, even if liability immunity is not available
to a member, a member could decline to testify's 0 based on the privilege, and evidence regarding legislative acts or their underlying moti424
Cf Brewser 408 U.S. at 528 ("The Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit inquiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some nexus to legislative functions.")
425

408 U.S. 501 (1972).

Cf Bainbridge, Inside the Altway, supranote 9, at 303 n.153 (comparing legislator
insider trading to legislator bribery under Brewster and stressing that both fall outside the
scope of legislative activity).
427 Brewster; 408 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 512 ("A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to
the business before it.").
428 See id. at 524-25 ("But financial abuses by way of bribes, perhaps even more than
Executive power, would gravely undermine legislative integrity and defeat the right of the
public to honest representation."); Bainbridge, Inside theBeltway, supranote 9, at 303 ("[B]y
removing the perverse incentives such trading opportunities create, the legislative process
would be enhanced.").
429 United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that certain
exhibits and emails that discussed status of actual legislation should have been excluded
from the grand jury based on these privileges). For the justification of this holding, see
generally id. at 1020, 1035 n.27 (describing three distinct protections-liability immunity,
testimonial privilege, and evidentiary privilege). Whether the Clause creates also a nondisclosure privilege applicable against the Executive Branch is in dispute. Compare United
States v. Rayburn House, 497 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding the privilege), with
Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1034 (rejecting the privilege).
426

430

See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606. 616 (1972) (recognizing testimonial

privilege).
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vation could be excluded from grand and petit juries or at trial.4a
This could impede prosecutorial efforts because proof of a breach of
fiduciary duty would ordinarily require some showing that the member somehow obtained the nonpublic information in question by reason of the member's connection to Congress. That, in turn, could
require tracing the provenance of the information to the member's
performance of a legislative act,4 3 2 e.g., the member's attendance at a
subcommittee briefing in which the information in question was conveyed. Thus, a court could exclude evidence establishing the member's presence at a critical briefing (e.g., a transcript of the briefing)
on the grounds that such evidence refers to a legislative act that is
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.433 Indeed, in United States
v. Swindal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed certain
indictments against a congressman where the evidence solicited by
the prosecution attempted to establish the congressman's membership
434
in certain congressional committees.
That said, there will be many occasions in which the relevant information will not have been obtained in the course of a member's
performance of a legislative act. For example, the member may acquire the information while the member was engaged in so-called political activities, which do not fall within the core conduct protected by
the Speech or Debate Clause. These activities include a "wide range
of legitimate 'errands' performed for constituents, the making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Govern431 SeeUnited States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1979) (holding that evidence
that refers to a member's legislative act or inquiries into the motivation behind a legislative
act may not be introduced in a government prosecution). It is not entirely clear whether a
member can waive the Speech or Debate Clause. Seeid at 490-91 (holding that if waiver is
possible, it "can be found only after explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the protection," but not deciding the question of its possibility).
432 SeeUnited States. v. Renzi, 686 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (D. Ariz. 2010) (referring to
the definition of "legislative act" as "an act generally done in Congress in relation to the
business before it ... or things said or done ... as a representative, in the exercise of the
functions of that office" (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
43
Although neither pure speech nor debate, a member's attendance at congressional
hearings, briefings, or debates nonetheless is necessary to performing all other legislative
functions that are clearly protected by the Clause, such as voting or preparing committee
reports. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "congressional efforts to
inform itself through committee hearings are part of the legislative function." Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132-133 (1979).
434 United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992). The prosecution
presented the evidence relating to the Congressman's membership status in certain committees for the purpose of supporting an inference that the Congressman had "unique and
specific knowledge" of certain statutory provisions. The establishment of such knowledge
was critical to the prosecution's case of perjury. Seeid. at 1542. It should be noted, however, that the Court declined to dismiss the other indictments, where the prosecution established the requisite evidence with reference to a legislative act. Seeid. (declining to
dismiss Count Five).
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ment contracts, preparing [newsletters] to constituents, news releases,
and speeches delivered outside the Congress." 35
To take a concrete example, imagine that a member meets with a
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) official on behalf of a constituent to discuss the agency's dealings with the constituent. During the
meeting, the FDA official tells the member in confidence that the
FDA intends to approve a potential blockbuster drug, manufactured
by a particular publicly held pharmaceutical company. If the member
trades on such information, the Speech or Debate Clause should pose
no obstacle for the prosecution's case. Of course, the resolution of
any particular case will turn on the specific facts. Suffice it to say that
there will be many cases in which the member obtained the information via a sufficiently close nexus to the member's official position to
justify imposing the insider trading prohibition.
Finally, it should be noted that the Speech or Debate Clause does
not immunize members of Congress from ordinary criminal process,
including properly issued search warrants, even of congressional offices.45 6 In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause creates no substantive
liability immunity because insider trading is not a legitimate legislative
activity. It may, however, create some evidentiary difficulties, depend437
ing on the type of evidence sought.
CONCLUSION

Legislators, federal and state, are not statutorily exempted from
federal insider trading law. Instead, the reason why federal insider
trading law is thought not to apply to them is because legislators are
thought not to be fiduciaries to anyone. But as I have argued, that
majority view is mistaken. Judges could have and still can find legislators to be fiduciaries to the people, the legislature (and fellow legislators), and the government that they serve. In support, I have
provided relevant cases and also plausible analogies to the private trustee, the director, and the partner. Even more, I have explained that
those analogies are justified because they further an underlying policy
of fiduciary law stopping corruption. Finally, I have demonstrated
that there are no overwhelming objections, although prosecutors may
435 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512. Also, in Gravel, the Court held that the lobbying of executive branch officials, though generally done, was not protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause because such activity was "beyond the legislative sphere." 408 U.S. at 625-26. In
addition, promiws to perform a legislative act are not protected by the Clause. See Heltoski,
442 U.S. at 489.
436 See NowAr & ROTUNDA, supra note 409, at 312-13.
437 In addition, the Privilege from Arrest Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, is inapplicable
because the privilege is limited to protection from civil arrest, which is now an obsolete
practice. See NowAr & ROTUNDA, supra note 409, at 312; Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway,
supra note 9, at 302.
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face evidentiary obstacles in making their case, as posed by the Speech
or Debate Clause.
It is tempting to think that all of this is academic given the passage of the STOCK Act. But that Act addresses the majority view only
for members of Congress. The conventional wisdom that legislators
are not fiduciaries remains intact for the more than seven thousand
state legislators in service. Worse, the Act's passage may solidify and
canonize this mistaken understanding of fiduciary law and thereby of
federal insider trading law, with unintended consequences. Thus, it
still matters that judges get federal insider trading law right.

